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TO BEAR OR NOT TO BEAR:
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM AS AN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT
Berta E. Herndndez*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to reproductive freedom' is recognized and pro-
tected in virtually every corner of this world. Domestic and in-
ternational tribunals have increasingly found that the right to
privacy includes such a right.2 For example, in the United States
a woman's fundamental right to reproductive freedom is
grounded upon the constitutional right to privacy.' As Justice
Brennan explained in Eisenstadt v. Baird:4 "[i]f the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
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1. The use throughout this Article of the term "reproductive freedom" means just
that: the individual's choice to reproduce or not to reproduce. In this context, the term
includes, for example, the right to have or to refrain from having an abortion. The latter,
albeit not the "usual" perspective, is an important consideration because large, populous
countries, notably India and China, in an attempt to curb tremendous population growth
not only encourage but also often apply coercive pressure on women to have abortions -
even when women would rather carry the child. For a discussion of China's coercive
population control policies, see Note, Coercive Population Control Policies: An Illustra-
tion of the Need for a Conscientious Objector Provision for Asylum Seekers, 30 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1007, 1010-16 (1990).
2. See infra notes 70-220 and accompanying text (Parts II & III). See also Cook,
Abortion Laws and Policies: Challenges and Opportunities, 1989 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY &
OasTrErics 61, 71 (Supp. 3) [hereinafter Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies].
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This includes the right to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 153. Numerous articles have been written on abortion and
the Roe decision and are beyond the scope of this Article. However, for a listing of well
over 100 articles on abortion published shortly after the Roe decision, see 17 Index to
Legal Periodicals 1-3 (1977). The Roe decision was and still is exceedingly controversial.
4. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court invalidated a law that
made it more difficult for unmarried persons to obtain contraceptive devices than it was
for married persons.
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single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."5 Very recently the Canadian
Supreme Court, essentially agreeing with the United States
view, invalidated Criminal Code provisions limiting access to
abortion as infringing on a woman's right to security of the per-
son in derogation of principles of fundamental justice contained
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.6
In addition, in the international sphere, since 1966 myriad
international resolutions, declarations and statements by inter-
national groups have acknowledged that matters of family plan-
ning and reproductive freedom are issues of individual rights.7
Similarly domestic legislation worldwide reflects the recognition
of the right to reproductive freedom.8 Thus, reproductive free-
dom as a matter of concern to the international community9 is
5. Id. at 453. Thereafter, in 1973, the Court in Roe and in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973) determined that the right of privacy recognized in Eisenstadt was "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
410 U.S. at 153. Specifically, the court recognized that the right to an abortion was pro-
tected by the fundamental right of privacy. Notwithstanding some erosion of the right to
choose by the United States Supreme Court in allowing states not to grant financial
assistance for abortion services in certain instances (see, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see generally Smith, Abortion: From Roe to
Webster, 33 CATH. LAW. 237 (1990)) and most recently in upholding regulations that,
inter alia prohibit Title X projects, particularly medical doctors, from providing counsel-
ling concerning abortions as a method of family planning even when a patient expressly
asks for such counselling, Rust v. Sullivan, 59 U.S.L.W. 4451 (1991) the Fifth Amend-
ment right to choose remains. The 1983 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc. decision contained strong language supporting the position that "the right to pri-
vacy, grounded in the concept of personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, en-
compasses a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." 462 U.S. 416
(1983). Even the recent Sullivan decision noted that "the regulations do not impermissi-
bly burden a woman's Fifth Amendment rights. . ." 59 U.S.L.W. at 4459.
6. Morgenthaler, Smoling and Scott v. The Queen, 44 D.L.R.4th 385 (Can. 1988).
7. For a comprehensive list of such declarations and resolutions, see Isaacs, Repro-
ductive Rights 1983: An International Survey, 14 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 311, 319
n.47 (1983) [hereinafter Isaacs, Reproductive Rights].
8. See infra notes 162-219 and accompanying text (Part III).
9. Specifically, the 1968 Proclamation of Tehran asserted: "the protection of the
family and of the child remains the concern of the international community. Parents
have the basic human right to determine freely and responsibly the number and the
spacing of their children." Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights,
U.N. Doc A/Conf. 32/41 (Apr. 22 to May 13, 1968), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS: A Cozi-
PILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS at 19, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/i (U.N. Sales No.
E.73.XIV.2 (1973)). This right was reiterated in the 1974 World Population Plan of Ac-
tion in Bucharest. There, representatives of 136 governments stated that "[a]ll couples
and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and
spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so."
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part of a personal right of privacy as well as part of a fabric of
social rights which include rights to health care and equality for
women.10 Using the various "sources"1 of international law as
an analytical framework, this Article posits, based on an interna-
tionalist's 2 perspective, that reproductive freedom - as part of
the penumbral zone of enumerated and existing human rights or
as a particular right in se - is now included in the body of pro-
tected international human rights. Consequently, any govern-
ment interference with the individual's exercise of such freedom
constitutes an impermissible intrusion into the individual's
human rights.
Specifically, part II posits that the substantive individual
rights of privacy, health and equality - either as treaty rights
or as customary international law derived from general accept-
ance of the treaty rights - protects peripheral rights that in-
clude the human right to reproductive freedom. In reaching this
result, the Article reviews decisions of international and domes-
Macklin, Liberty, Utility, and Justice: An Ethical Approach to Unwanted Pregnancy,
1989 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 37, 40 (Supp. 3) (quoting United Nations:
World Population Plan of Action, in 1 THE POPULATION DEBATE: DIMENSIONS AND PER-
SPECTIVES 155-67 (1975)) [hereinafter Macklin]. Most recently at the 1985 United Na-
tions Conference on the Decade of Women, Third World women from 26 countries and
their supporters from 17 Western countries echoed this standard and emphasized the
need for all methods of family planning, including abortion, so that women's health and
participation in society could be enhanced. The statement provided:
"Women in the Third World demand access to all methods of family planning,
including abortion as a back-up method, and assert our right to choose for
ourselves what is best for us in our situations. By protecting our lives we pro-
tect the lives of those children that we generally want and can care for. This is
our conception of 'Pro-Life'."
A. GERMAIN, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND DIGNITY: CHOICES BY THIRD WORLD WOMEN
(1987), technical background paper commissioned for the International Conference on
Better Health for Women and Children Through Family Planning, Nairobi, Kenya, Oc-
tober 5-9, 1987.
10. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 353.
11. Stat. I.C.J. art 38. The sources of both international human rights and interna-
tional law generally are the same. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 102, 701 comment a (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
12. What the Article refers to as the internationalist's perspective is the considera-
tion that all peoples equally possess individual rights - regardless of whether they are
from large or small nations, rich or poor nations. U.N. CHARTER. The purpose as ex-
pressed in the preamble to the United Nations Charter includes the reaffirmance of
"faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." U.N. CHARTER pre-
amble. But see Texaco Overseas Petroleum v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, 30
(1978) (where arbitrator discounted a majority vote on various resolutions concerning
expropriation because they were not supported "by any of the developed countries with
market economies which carry on the largest part of international trade").
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tic tribunals as well as pronouncements of international bodies
that expressly recognize (a) reproductive freedom as a privacy
right; (b) the nexus between health and reproductive freedom;
and (c) the relationship between reproductive freedom and
women's ability to participate equally in society. The Article
also explains why the usual rationale for condemning abortion
- protection of fetal life - cannot justify any interference with
reproductive freedom. International and domestic tribunals in-
terpreting international law uniformly have concluded that the
unborn are not "persons" and thus do not enjoy rights, in partic-
ular the right to life, under international law.
Part III reviews domestic abortion laws worldwide and con-
cludes that these laws - either as "general principles of law rec-
ognized by civilized nations" or as international customary law
derived from the practice of nations as evidenced, in part, by
legislation - establish reproductive freedom as an internation-
ally protected human right in se.13 The analysis plainly shows
that the vast majority of states have positive laws recognizing
the right to reproductive choice thus establishing the right as a
general principle of law. Significantly, the small minority of
states with restrictive regulations honor such regulations in the
breach. The actual practice in those states, as in states that have
expressed the right, reveals that reproductive choice, specifically
abortion, exists without state interference or prosecution. Thus,
the general practice of states establishes that reproductive free-
dom is protected as international customary law.
The following sections first briefly explain the "sources" of
international human rights law and then describe the emergence
of the modern view of such law - providing the historical back-
ground predicate to establishing reproductive freedom as an in-
ternational human right.
A. The Sources of Human Rights Laws
The sources of international law considered here to estab-
lish a right to reproductive freedom are those listed in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice:14 (1) trea-
13. Stat. I.C.J. art. 38(1)(b), (c). See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-
84 (2d Cir. 1980) (in considering factors to determine that customary law proscribed
torture, the court considered evidence that indicated the widespread adoption of domes-
tic laws opposing torture).
14. Similarly, in the United States, international law "may be ascertained by con-
sulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage
[Vol. XVII:2
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ties,15 (2) customary law,16 (3) general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations 17 and (4) "judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations ... ."I's Following, these sources of international law
are discussed briefly.
1. Human Rights Agreements
Treaties - agreements between two or among more states
or international organizations that are "intended to be legally
binding and governed by international law"' 9 - have become
the principal method for making law in the international legal
system. 0 International human rights agreements have created
obligations and responsibilities for states in respect of all indi-
and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law."
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820) (the Smith court, looking
at the work of learned writers held that a statute proscribing piracy as defined by the
Law of Nations was sufficiently clear to afford the basis for a death sentence). The court
in Filartiga, in explaining customary law and general principles as sources of interna-
tional law, which it noted was a part of United States law, stated that:
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judi-
cial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations;
and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, experi-
ence, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subject of
which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
630 F.2d at 880-81 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)); see also
Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroeder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
Customary law in the United States is federal law, which, like treaties and other
international agreements, is accorded supremacy over state law by article VI of the Con-
stitution. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
15. Stat. I.C.J. art. 38(1)(a); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 102(1)(B).
16. Stat. I.C.J. art. 38(1)(b).
17. Id. at art. 38(1)(c).
18. Id. at art. 38(1)(d).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 301(1). Such agreements, however, tech-
nically create obligations that are binding only between or among the contracting states
and thus are only a source of law with respect to such parties. Nevertheless, multilateral
agreements which are open to all states are used increasingly for general legislation to
make new law such as human rights. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 102 com-
ment f. Such agreements also are used for codifying and developing customary law as in
the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying
text.
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, pt. I, Introductory Note. Much of the es-
tablished customary law has been codified by general agreements. Nevertheless, even
subsequent to codification, customary law remains as a source in particular with respect
to states that do not adhere to codifying treaties. For a discussion of custom as a source
of international law, see infra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
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viduals subject to their jurisdiction, including their own nation-
als.21 In fact, one purpose of creating the United Nations was "to
achieve international co-operation ... in promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. '22
Thus, the United Nations Charter was the first formal articula-
tion of human rights as a matter for international concern.23
Subsequent to the Charter, myriad human rights instru-
ments have been executed, including international and regional
agreements which give further protection to human rights24 spe-
cifically recognizing the rights to privacy,25 health,2 and equality
21. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). For example, obligations assumed by
the United States in the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of
American States, both of which include human rights provisions and both of which are
treaties of the United States, are the law of the land. See also Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1967) (states
agreeing that the Human Rights Committee established by the covenant may consider
complaints by individuals).
22. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 55-56.
23. R. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (1986) [hereinafter R. WALLACE]. The
United States is bound by the U.N. Charter which "stands as the symbol of human
rights on an international scale. . . and resolves to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights and in the dignity of the human person." Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp.
787, 796 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub nom., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d
1382 (10th Cir. 1981). But see, e.g., Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 343
F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965), (holding that the Charter was
not self-executing and thus its articles did not create binding obligations on the United
States).
24. The analysis of the development and evolution of the rights to privacy, health
and equality in Part II supports the thesis of this Article that reproductive freedom is a
peripheral right under the enumerated rights and, consequently, is an internationally
protected human right sourced in treaties and customary law.
25. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at art. 12 (1948) ("No one shall be subject to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . .") [hereinafter Universal Declara-
tion]. See also id. at art. 16 on right to marry and found a family; International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at art. 17
(1966) ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence. . . .") [hereinafter Civil Covenant]; European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
8(1), Council of Europe, Eur. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (1954) ("Everyone has the
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence . . .)
[hereinafter European Convention] (see also art. 12 granting the right to marry and
found a family); the American Convention on Human Rights, art. 11 , O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser. 4 v/II 23, Doc. 21, rev. 2 (English ed. 1975) ("No one may be
the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home,
or his correspondence . . . .") [hereinafter American Convention]; see also id. at art. 17
(granting the right to marry and found a family).
26. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 12 ("1. The State
1991] TO BEAR OR NOT TO BEAR
based on sex."' Part II reviews these specific rights as the basis
for protecting the penumbral right of reproductive freedom as
an international human right.
2. Customary Law of Human Rights
Custom, and law made by international agreement, are co-
equal as international legal authority. Customary law results
from a general and consistent state practice followed from a
sense of legal obligation.2" The best evidence of customary law is
proof of state practice as demonstrated by official documents,
including treaties, 29 and other indications of governmental ac-
Parties . . .recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health. 2. The steps to be taken.. . shall include...
[t]he provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality . . .")
[hereinafter Economic Covenant]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46)
U.N. Doc. A/34/49 ("States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to
family planning . . . .") [hereinafter Women's Convention]; Universal Declaration,
supra note 25, at art. 25 ("Everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well being of himself and his family. . . including medical care.").
27. U.N. CHARTER preamble ("reaffirm ... the equal rights of men and women
."); U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3) ("promoting and encouraging human rights and for fun-
damental freedoms for all without distinction as to ... sex . . . ."); Universal Declara-
tion, supra note 25, at art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in this declaration, without discrimination of any kind such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion . . . ."); Women's Convention, supra note
26 passim; Civil Covenant, supra note 25, at arts. 2 (no distinction on rights under cove-
nant based on sex), 3 ("The states parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure
the equal rights of men and women" to the rights set forth in the covenant.), 26 ("the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as. . .sex .. "); Economic Cov-
enant, supra note 26, at arts. 2 (the rights under the covenant are to be exercised with-
out discrimination on the basis of sex, among other things), 3 ("The State Parties to the
present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoy-
ment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant
... "); European Convention, supra note 25, at art. 14 ("The enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex. . . ."); American Convention, supra note 25, at art. 1 (rights and
freedoms under Convention are without discrimination on the basis of sex, among other
things).
28. Stat. I.C.J. art. 38(1)(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 102 comment b.
29. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,
28-29, 37-43. Thus, when a multilateral agreement is designed for adherence by states
generally, is widely accepted, and is not rejected by a significant number of important
states it may become law for the nonparties that do not dissent. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 11, § 102 comment i. For example, the Charter of the United Na-
tions has been adhered to by virtually all states. Even the few remaining nonmember
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tion such as official statements of policy whether unilateral or
that result from cooperation with other states.3 Thus, national
courts deciding questions of international customary law ex-
amine actions of states around the world. 1
A customary international law of human rights3 2 based upon
state practice, human rights agreements and other international
instruments3 3 has developed and has continued to grow. 3 4 The
states have acquiesced in the principles it established. Consequently, many of the Char-
ter's provisions, such as those prohibiting the use of force, have become rules of interna-
tional law binding on all states. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 102 com-
ment h. Similarly, the Continental Shelf cases established that a treaty rule can become
a general rule of international law if representative states participated in the treaty, par-
ticularly states whose interests were at stake. 1969 I.C.J. 3. Originally, the practice of
states had to continue over an extended period of time to establish customary law. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 102 Reporter's Note 2. In deciding the Continental
Shelf cases, however, the International Court of Justice agreed that "the passage of only
a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule
of customary international law." 1969 I.C.J. at 49.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 103 comment a. "[E]very document
demonstrating the conduct of States in certain situations can serve as evidence of the
element of practice" necessary to establish custom. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER &
H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (2 ed. 1987) [hereinafter L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER & H. SMIT] (citing WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964)).
As Judge Lachs stated in his dissent in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, "Even unra-
tified treaties may constitute a point of departure for a legal practice." 1969 I.C.J. at 225.
31. Pertinent state action may include acts of foreign legislatures and diplomats, as
well as juridical decisions of national and international tribunals. RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 11, pt. I, Introductory Note. The United States Supreme Court has ascribed
the basic principles governing the application of customary international law in domestic
courts as follows:
international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this pur-
pose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators
who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves pecu-
liarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are
resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors con-
cerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law
really is.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 702, sets out the customary interna-
tional law of human rights. The violations of human rights cited in this section, however,
are violations of customary international law only if practiced, encouraged or condoned
by the government of a state as state policy. The presumption may arise that a govern-
ment has condoned or encouraged prohibited acts, however, if such acts have been taking
place and the state has taken no steps either to prevent the acts or to punish the actors.
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, pt. VII, Introductory Note, at 145 (refer-
ring to id. § 702). For example, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala the court had no trouble finding
that "[iln light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous international
1991] TO BEAR OR NOT TO BEAR
International Court of Justice and the International Law Com-
mission have recognized the existence of customary human
rights law.3 5 Domestic courts also apply the law of nations -
international customary law - to protect human rights.36
Because the practice creating customary human rights laws
includes the relationship between a state and its own nationals
and residents, what is accepted as creating customary interna-
tional law of human rights may be widely different from the
agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtu-
ally all of the nations of the world (in principle if not in practice),. . . an act of torture
committed by a state official against one held in detention violates the established norms
of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations." 630 F.2d 879,
880 (2d Cir. 1980). In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the Universal Decla-
ration, supra note 25, and the American Convention, supra note 25, as well as the Civil
Covenant, supra note 25, and the European Convention, supra note 25, (although the
United States is not a signatory to the latter two), because these human rights instru-
ments evidence modern usage and practice of nations. More recently, in Nelson v. Saudi
Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district
courts had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988)), in an ac-
tion for damages for the detention and torture of the plaintiff by agents of the Saudi
Government in Saudi Arabia.
Similarly, in Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-800 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd
sub nom., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981), the court,
using the Universal Declaration, supra note 25, and the American Convention, supra
note 25, as authority, and citing to the European Convention, supra note 25, and the
Civil Covenant, supra note 25, as principal sources of human rights law evidencing the
custom and usage of nations, agreed that international law secured a prisoner the right
to be free from arbitrary detention.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, pt. VII, Introductory Note. The custom-
ary international law of human rights is also the law of the United States. Significantly,
in the United States Federal statutes refer to "internationally recognized human rights"
and have legislated national policy towards governments guilty of "consistent patterns of
violations" of such rights. See, e.g., the United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended ("no assistance may be provided. . . to the government of any country which
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, pro-
longed detention without charges, . . or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty
and the security of the person . . ." 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1988). See also 22 U.S.C. §
2304 (1988) which provides that no security assistance may be provided to such govern-
ments. See also Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-
1736bb-6, sec. 1712 (1988) (no financing of the sale of agricultural commodities to such
government); International Bureaus, Congresses, etc., 22 U.S.C. §§ 261-290K-11, sec.
262d (1988) (United States policy opposes assistance to such government by interna-
tional financial institutions with the exception of instances where the program serves
"the basic human needs" of the citizens of such country).
35. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 32.
36. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see generally T. FRANCK &
M. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 98 (1987).
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practices that generally establish customary international law.",
For example, norms that create "international crimes" and obli-
gate all states to proceed against violations are considered pe-
remptory norms of international law - norms from which no
state can deviate. Such norms might include rules prohibiting
genocide, slave trade and slavery, apartheid and other gross vio-
lations of human rights. 8 An analysis of state action in respect
to reproductive freedom reveals the emergence of such a right as
a rule of customary international human rights law, either as a
peripheral right to the international common law protecting the
human rights to privacy, health and equality (Part II) or as a
particular right (Part III).
3. "General Principles": Individual Rights Protected by and
Common to Many Legal Systems
International law can also be derived by "borrowing" gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations from mu-
nicipal law systems. General principles are those applied by the
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 701 Reporter's Note 2, lists the practice
of states that creates customary human rights laws:
Practice of states that is accepted as building customary human rights law in-
cludes: virtually universal adherence to the United Nations Charter and its
human rights provisions, and virtually universal and frequently reiterated ac-
ceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights even if only in princi-
ple; virtually universal participation of states in the preparation and adoption
of international agreements recognizing human rights principles generally, or
particular rights; the adoption of human rights principles by states in regional
organizations in Europe, Latin America and Africa (citation omitted); general
support by states for United Nations resolutions declaring, recognizing, invok-
ing, and applying international human rights principles as international law;
action by states to conform their national law or practice to standards or prin-
ciples declared by international bodies, and the incorporation of human rights
provisions, directly or by reference, in national constitutions and laws; invoca-
tion of human rights principles in national policy, in diplomatic practice, in
international organization activities and actions; and other diplomatic commu-
nications or action by states reflecting the view that certain practices violate
international human rights law, including condemnation and other adverse
state reactions to violations by other states.
Some of the above listed practices also support the conclusion that particular human
rights-have been absorbed into international law as general principles common to major
state legal systems. Id., Reporter's Note 2. See also id., § 702, Reporter's Note 1.
38. Id., § 102, Reporter's Note 6. In the United States, the Restatement has ac-
cepted the category of Erga Omnes obligations - obligations that arise, inter alia, from
the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of human persons, including protec-
tion from slavery and racial discrimination as including customary law obligations in
respect of human rights. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 702.
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most representative systems of municipal law.3 9 General princi-
ples common to municipal legal systems can thereby fill "gaps"
in international law that treaties and customary international
law fail to address.40 A given principle that is affirmed con-
stantly in international judicial decisions and accepted in the
practice of states acquires the status of custom.4 A search for
general principles can be conducted through an exercise in com-
parative law.42
The use of municipal law principles is limited by the re-
quirement that such principles be appropriate for application on
the international level.43 Tribunals which apply "general princi-
ples" have not carried out detailed examinations of the major
national law systems to determine whether these principles per-
vade "the municipal law of nations in general. '44 Nevertheless, a
rule of municipal law common to many legal systems may be
deemed to have become either a rule of customary law or a law
implied by treaty. 5
Municipal laws concerned with, inter alia, the individual
39. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrT, supra note 30, at 98 (quoting
Mann, Reflections on a Commercial Law of Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20, 34-39
(1957) [hereinafter Mann]). See also M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW
47 (1988) [hereinafter M. JANIS]. A general principle of law is a proposition that can be
found virtually in every legal system. At one time, however, the term "civilized nations"
meant European states and later included the United States and still later Japan. At
present it is recognized that a search for general principles of law should include all
states in the community of nations. Id. (citing G. GONG, THE STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION
IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1984)).
40. M. JANIS, supra note 39, at 47.
41. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 30, at 90-91 (quoting
M. Virally, The Sources of International Law in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
116, 143-148 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968)). Once a general principle is accepted as interna-
tional customary law, it does not matter that the principle originally was borrowed from
municipal law. The source "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" has
only been employed in individual or dissenting opinions, and never in the majority deci-
sions of the courts. Courts have on several occasions, however, applied principles that are
"generally recognized" or "admitted" and certainly borrowed from municipal law, but
have not conclusively acquired the status of customary rules.
42. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that torture
violates customary international law based upon a review inter alia of the domestic law
rules "of over fifty-five nations" which revealed a consensus proscribing torture as a vio-
lation of international law). See also M. JANIS, supra note 39, at 48.
43. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 30, at 92 (quoting
Schachter, International Law and Theory in Practice, 178 REc. DES COURs 78-80 (1982-
V) [hereinafter Schachter]).
44. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 30, at 99 (quoting
Mann, supra note 39).
45. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrT, supra note 30, at 96.
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should not be incorporated into the international legal spectrum
"lock, stock, and barrel." However, domestic legal principles re-
garding individual rights that enjoy general recognition are ap-
propriate for adoption into international law.46 As is shown in
Part III, principles recognizing an individual's right to make re-
productive choices are universally found in domestic legal sys-
tems and thus are appropriately applied in international law.
Moreover, general principles of law have been used, particularly
in United States courts, to substantiate proof of customary in-
ternational law. 7 Given the virtually uniform existence of do-
mestic laws recognizing the right to reproductive freedom, such
rules are properly construed as having acquired the status of
custom.
B. The Evolution of Human Rights - Establishing Reproduc-
tive Freedom as an International Human Right
International human rights are those vital to individuals'
existence - they are fundamental and inalienable rights, predi-
cates to life as human beings.48 Human rights are moral, social,
and political rights that concern respect and dignity associated
with our lives as individuals49 and have their origin in "natural
46. L. HENriN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 30, at 92-93 (quoting
Schachter, supra note 43). Professor Schachter states that "[iln these areas, we may look
to representative legal systems not only for the highly abstract principles of the kind
referred to earlier but to more specific rules that are sufficiently widespread as to be
considered 'recognized by civilized nations.' It is likely that such rules will enter into
international law largely through international treaties or particular arrangements ac-
cepted by the parties." Id. The general provisions of such treaties and arrangements
require supplementing. Such supplementation can often be achieved by recourse to com-
monly accepted national rules. Id.
47. The Filartiga court's comparative study of domestic law rules outlawing torture,
when added to the analysis of treaties, state practice, and opinions of judges and publi-
cists, led to the conclusion that a rule of customary law prohibiting torture existed. Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980). The Court stated: "Having examined
the sources from which customary international law is derived . . . the usage of nations,
judicial opinions and the works of jurists . . . we conclude that official torture is now
prohibited by the law of nations." Id. at a78-85. Similar to the prohibition against tor-
ture, the proscription against prolonged arbitrary detention is a violation of human
rights that reflects a general principle of law common to the major legal systems. Fernan-
dez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), af'd sub nom., 654 F.2d 1382 (10th
Cir. 1981). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 702, Reporter's Note 1 (list-
ing in addition to torture and arbitrary detention, prohibitions against slavery, murder
or causing disappearance of individuals, and racial discrimination as other rules of cus-
tomary international law which also are "general principles.").
48. R. WALLACE, supra note 23, at 175.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 701 comment b, at 152. A full history of
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law [and] in contemporary moral values. '5 °
The inclusion of international human rights law5 as part of
international law is a relatively recent development.2 However,
it is universally accepted that the way a sovereign treats individ-
uals - both its own citizens and aliens - is a matter of interna-
tional concern.5
the development of international human rights laws is beyond the scope of this Article.
For comprehensive coverage of this subject, see L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY
(1968); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980) [hereinaf-
ter M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN]; L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973) [hereinafter L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL].
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, pt. VII, Introductory Note; see also L.
HENRIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 30, at ch. 12.
51. International law and various international agreements recognize human rights
of individuals and sometimes give individuals remedies before international bodies. See,
e.g., M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 71-74 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter M. AKEHURST]; L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note
30, at 980-1039; M. JANIS, supra note 39, at 174-97; G. VON GLAHN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 10 (4th ed. 1981) [hereinafter G. VON GLAHN]; R. WAL-
LACE, supra note 23, at ch. 9. Conversely, individuals may be held liable for offenses
against international law, such as piracy, war crimes or genocide. RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 11, pt. II, Introductory Note, at 70-71. See also The Nuremberg Trial, 6
F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).
52. This change shows an evolution of philosophy and marked departure from the
positivists' doctrinal view that only states can be subjects of international law. Interna-
tional law traditionally was defined as the law of the international community of states
that deals with the conduct of nation-states and their relations with other states, and to
some extent also with their relations with individuals, business organizations, and other
legal entities throughout the state. For example, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 (1962) defined international law as follows: "'Inter-
national law,' as used in the Restatement of this Subject, means those rules of law appli-
cable to a state or international organization that cannot be modified unilaterally by
it." (emphasis added) Increasingly, however, individuals (and other entities) have been
accorded international personality in various measures. R. WALLACE, supra note 23, at 1.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 101, at 127, reflects this change by defining in-
ternational law as follows: "International law, as used in this Restatement, consists of
rules and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of states and of in-
ternational organizations and with their relations inter se as well as with some of their
relations with persons, whether natural or juridical." See also M. AKEHURST, supra note
51, at ch. 1; M. JANIS, supra note 39, at 163-97; G. VON GLAHN, supra note 51, at 1-11; R.
WALLACE, supra note 23, at 163-97.
53. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56. While the U.N. Charter has been deemed not to be
wholly self-executing (See, e.g., Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 343
F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965)), courts have used the
Charter as well as other non-self-executing agreements as evidence of binding principles
of international law. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The
United Nations Charter (a treaty of the United States (citation omitted)) makes it clear
that in this modern age a state's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international
concern."); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (government's duty
under international law to refrain from kidnapping a criminal defendant from within the
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This modern view of human rights emerged in 1945 with the
Nuremberg Tribunals and the Charter of the United Nations"
that together revolutionized the nature of human rights. The
Tribunal concluded that "[c]rimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punish-
ing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced."55 Thus, the vivid awareness of
Nazi human rights atrocities prompted the nations of the world
expressly to require that the new United Nations organization
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. 56 The Nu-
remberg Trials defined the relationship of individuals to interna-
tional law and conclusively established that the rules of public
international law should and, in fact, do apply to individuals. 7
Central to this philosophy of international human rights
laws is that every individual has rights in his or her society with
which the state cannot interfere but, rather, which the state
must recognize, respect and ensure.5 Thus, states have assumed
human rights obligations, the protection of which is not left
solely to the states.59 Instead, human rights issues are matters of
international concern subject to control by international law. 0
Universal acceptance of human rights principles has resulted in
an inclination to find legal obligation in the broad language of
international agreements concerning human rights, such as the
general language of the United Nations Charter. 1 In addition,
other international human rights instruments concluded after
borders of another nation where formal extradition procedures existed because, as such,
action infringed on the personal rights of the defendants).
54. Human rights thereafter developed progressively via treaties and customary law.
See infra notes 89-115 and accompanying text.
55. The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).
56. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3); supra note 22 and accompanying text. See gener-
ally Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69.
57. Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D., at 110. In condemning "war crimes," "crimes against
peace," and "crimes against humanity" the Tribunal referred to national law, interna-
tional agreements, customs and practices of states that have obtained universal recogni-
tion, and general principles of justice as the "sources" of the law of war. Nuremberg
Trial, 6 F.R.D., at 106-12, 130. See also M. JANIS, supra note 39, at 176.
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, pt. VII, Introductory Note (citing Id. §
701, comment a).
59. M. JANIS, supra note 39, at 176.
60. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (quoting Stotzky,
Book Review, 11 LAW. AMERICAS 229 (1979) (reviewing L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN
TODAY (1978))).
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 701, Reporter's Note 1.
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World War II reflect this universal obligation to protect individ-
uals' rights in society and for the first time in history specifically
articulate the international protection of certain rights, such as
the rights of privacy, health and equality. 2A similar expansive view of the development of human
rights is found in the practices creating customary human rights
law and the attendant legal obligations notwithstanding that
states may sometimes (or even often) violate the alleged rights..
Additionally, human rights protection in the constitutions or
laws of many states are considered part of international law,63
although principles common to domestic legal systems generally
are a secondary source of international law.6 4 This is the frame-
work against which individual human rights, here specifically re-
productive freedom, are reviewed in international law today.
Moreover, in analyzing reproductive freedom as an interna-
tionally protected human right it is imperative to understand
that historically states' regulation of reproduction never has
been premised upon some genuine concern for an individual's
human rights to privacy, health, equality or religion. Rather,
such regulation has been a response to the opposition to family
planning by influential religious institutions or to the sovereign's
own need to control population growth often based on labor or
military needs.
In this context, although abortion is a controversial method
of fertility control, it is indisputable that throughout history
women have exercised that option and will continue to do so
whatever the risks.65 Thus, as was stated at the United Nations
Conference on the Decade of Women, abortion cannot be di-
vorced from family planning and the protection of the individ-
ual's right to reproductive freedom must include access to
abortion. 6
62. These rights are discussed in this Article as sources of protection of an individ-
ual's reproductive freedom.
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 701, Reporter's Note 1. See also Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 701, Reporter's Note 1. Tribunals must
interpret international law as it has evolved and exists in the present time. Filartiga, 630
F.2d at 881 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198 (1796)) ("distinguishing between
'ancient' and 'modern' law of nations").
65. Sai & Nassim, The Need for a Reproductive Health Approach, 1989 INT'L J.
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 103, 107 (Supp. 3) (1989) [hereinafter Sai & Nassim].
66. Although abortion is only one narrow aspect of reproductive freedom, there is
probably little quarrel that it is the most controversial. Thus, the emphasis on abortion
throughout this paper is not with the purpose of excluding other reproductive options.
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A brief review of abortion regulation in recent history is in-
structive. For example, although abortions were decriminalized
in 1920 in the Soviet Union, the government reversed its policy
in the mid 1930s to compensate for the loss of population antici-
pated in expectation of a World War.8 7 Similarly, the devastat-
ing effects of World War II on population prompted many East-
ern European states to outlaw abortion in the hope of increasing
population to reestablish the labor force and rebuild armies. 6
Governments also have used abortion laws to reduce popu-
lation. For example, India and China are two countries with seri-
ous over-population problems in which sovereigns have insti-
tuted coercive abortion policies as part of the states' programs to
control population growth. 9
In sum, based upon a review of treaties, the decisions of do-
mestic and international tribunals interpreting the treaties, pol-
icy statements by international bodies supporting interpretation
of treaty rights, domestic legislation, actual practice of states,
and the opinion of experts in the field, this author concludes
that reproductive freedom is an internationally protected human
right. States' regulation of reproductive freedom to achieve pop-
ulation goals (which include, in the case of Nazi Germany, geno-
cide) or to placate influential religious institutions impermissibly
erodes the integrity of an individual and precludes such individ-
ual's exercise of his or her rights of privacy, health, equality, or
religion. Consequently, a state cannot regulate reproductive free-
dom without violating such individual's human rights as those
Rather, the emphasis is premised on the view that if resolution can be achieved with
respect to possibly the most controversial of family planning issues, such resolution
would encompass other less polemic alternatives.
67. In 1955, after Stalin, abortion was again decriminalized. Savage, The Law of
Abortion in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China:
Women's Rights in Two Socialist Countries, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1052-53 (1988).
68. See Note, Governmental Abortion Policies and the Right to Privacy; the Rights
of the Individual and the Rights of the Unborn, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 103 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Governmental Abortion Policies]. Even Hitler, shortly after rising to
power criminalized abortion and instituted an anti-abortion policy in order to increase
the population of the state. David, Fleischhacker & Hhn, Abortion and Eugenics in
Nazi Germany, 14 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 81, 89-101 (1988). In fact, during World War
II tribunals could impose the death penalty for illegal abortions. Id. at 81, 97. This new
policy resulted in many more abortionists being charged. Id. at 94. However, in Hitler's
Germany the charged abortionists successfully could use as a defense to the claims lev-
elled against them that the woman was Jewish - termination of a Jewish fetus did not
violate the proscription against abortion. Id.
69. Note, Governmental Abortion Policies, supra note 68, at 103.
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rights have evolved since the Nuremberg Trials.
II. THE RIGHTS To PRIVACY, HEALTH AND EQUALITY PROTECT
THE HUMAN RIGHT To REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM - TREATIES,
CUSTOM, JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND INFLUENTIAL PUBLICISTS
The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Universal Declaration or Declaration) and other
international agreements provide the framework for analyzing
reproductive freedom as an international human right. The
Charter's "reaffirm[ance of] faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women and of nations large and small...;70
its charge to the United Nations to promote "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion";
71
and the "pledge" of member states to ensure that such rights are
achieved are important statements with respect to reproductive
freedom.72 In this context, it is significant that "[s]ince 1968, the
United Nations has recognized, and repeatedly restated, the
right of individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number
and spacing of their children. '73
The Universal Declaration, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1948,74 proclaimed a series of political,
civil, economic, social, and cultural rights of individuals. 7 These
included for the first time the specific rights to privacy 76 and
health.77 The Declaration also reiterated the right to equality re-
70. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
73. Germain, The Christopher Tietze International Symposium: An Overview, 1989
INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 1, 4 (Supp. 3) (citing INTERNATIONAL PLANNED
PARENTHOOD FEDERATION, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO FAMILY PLANNING (1989)) [hereinafter
Germain, An Overview].
74. Universal Declaration, supra note 25. The Declaration was adopted without dis-
sent, but with eight states abstaining. Since then, virtually all states have given at least
some indication of support for the Declaration. It has been incorporated or reflected in
national constitutions and has contributed to an international law of human rights. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, pt. VII, Introductory Note.
75. For a discussion of the Universal Declaration, see supra notes 25-27 and accom-
panying text. Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Chair of the Commission on Human Rights
and a representative of the United States, prior to the final vote, explained the Declara-
tion was "to serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations." 5
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (1985).
76. Universal Declaration, supra note 25, at art. 12.
77. Universal Declaration, supra note 25, at art. 25.
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gardless of sex.78 Although initially the Universal Declaration
was an aspirational statement, it is now recognized as the stan-
dard of recognized rights.79 There is consensus today that the
rights enumerated therein - including the rights to privacy,
health and equality - are now protected as part of customary
law80 and its standards have now, through wide acceptance by
nations, become binding customary law and, in practice, fre-
quently invoked as legally binding by nations and by private in-
dividuals and groups."' In fact the United States has expressly
78. Universal Declaration, supra note 25, at art. 2.
79. Various international assemblies have recognized the principles of the Universal
Declaration as customary law. For example, the unofficial assembly for human rights,
which met in Montreal in March 1968 stated that "the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order,
and has over the years become a part of customary international law." Montreal State-
ment of the Assembly for Human Rights, reprinted in 9 J. INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS No.
1, 94, 95 (1968). In Teheran, at the official international conference on human rights
which met in April-May 1968, a similar conclusion was reached with the Proclamation of
Teheran which provided that the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights states a com-
mon understanding of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable
rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for the members
of the international community." Final Act of the International Conference on Human
Rights, May 13, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41 at 4 para. 2; U.N. Publ. E 68. XIV. 2. A
resolution was passed providing, among other things, that the Universal Declaration was
an obligation for the members of the international community. M. AKEHURST, supra note
51, at 77 (citing United Nations Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, April 22 to May
13, 1968, Proclamation of Teheran, reprinted in Official Documents: United Nations
Conference on Human Rights, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (1969)). See also Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882, 883 (2d Cir. 1980); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787,
796 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub nom., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382
(10th Cir. 1981). In 1968 the General Assembly endorsed the Proclamation of Teheran
"as an important and timely reaffirmation of the principles embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights." May 13, 1968, G.A. Res. 32/130, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 18) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41. The Secretary General also emphasized the
proclamation by the Teheran conference that "the Universal Declaration constitutes 'an
obligation for the members of the international community.'" Introduction to the An-
nual Report of the Secretary-General and the Work of the Organization, Sept. 1968, 23
Supp. No. I A (A/7201/ADD.1), at 13. L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 49, at
518-19, 522. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 701, Reporter's Note 6, at
156. As Sohn & Buergenthal have noted, the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the 1963 Declaration of the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination both proclaimed the duty to observe the provisions
of the declaration of human rights - and both declarations were adopted unanimously.
L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 49. With but a few variations, the same rights
found in the declaration are recognized by the Civil Covenant, supra note 25, and the
Economic Covenant, supra note 25. Additionally, these particular conventions also pro-
tect rights that are recognized in the Declaration. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11,
§ 701, Reporter's Note 5, at 156.
80. See R. WALLACE, supra note 23, at 186-87.
81. See Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 796 (D. Kan. 1980), afl'd sub
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accepted as law the international human rights standards set
forth in the Universal Declaration. 2
In addition, the Civil Covenant s and the Economic Cove-
nant, 4 both based on the Declaration, also expressly protect
these rights.8 5 Similarly, the Women's Convention, which focuses
on the right to equality on the basis of sex, protects such rights
nom., 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (quoting Bilder, The Status Of International
Human Rights Law: An Overview, 1978 INT'L L. PRAC. 1, 8). In Fernandez the court
concluded that "the Declaration has evolved into an important source of international
human rights law." 505 F. Supp. at 797. The Fernandez court also turned to the Ameri-
can Convention (now ratified by the United States), as a source of international human
rights law. Finally, the court relied on the Civil Covenant and the European Convention
as principal sources of fundamental human rights law, notwithstanding that the United
States is not bound by the documents themselves. The court stated that such documents
are "indicative of the customs and usages of civilized nations." Id. See also supra note
47.
82. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (the "prohibition
[against torture] has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and de-
fined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights .... "); Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at
797 (the "Declaration has evolved into an important source of international human
rights law"). See also M. AKEHURST, supra note 51, at 77. In fact, human rights norms
recognized as customary international law are law in the United States and can be en-
forced against the United States in appropriate proceedings. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0.
SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 30, at 995-96.
83. Civil Covenant, supra note 25. For provisions in Civil Covenant protecting rights
to privacy and equality, see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
84. Economic Covenant, supra note 26.
85. The United States is a signatory to very few international human rights agree-
ments and has ratified even fewer although it is bound by the United Nations Charter
which "resolves to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity of the
human person." Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 796. In 1978 President Carter transmitted to
the Senate the Civil Covenant, supra note 25, the Economic Covenant, supra note 26,
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, and the American Convention,
supra note 25. The Senate has not consented to any of these treaties and, thus, they
have not been ratified. However, even in the absence of ratification by the United States,
some provisions of these covenants and conventions reflect principles of customary inter-
national law and consequently form part of United States law. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at
883-84 (citing the Civil Covenant and the European Convention as part of the "universal
renunciation [of torture] in the modern usage and practice of nations"); Fernandez, 505
F. Supp. at 797 (referring to the European Convention and the Civil Covenant as "two
other principle [sic] sources of fundamental human rights" because they are "indicative
of the customs and usages of civilized nations"). Further, it is noteworthy that the acts
proscribed by the covenants and conventions are acts that the United States Constitu-
tion, federal or state law generally prohibit. Accordingly, the obligations these interna-
tional instruments would impose on the United States are in all events largely honored
pursuant to federal or state law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 701, Re-
porter's Note 8, at 159 and cases cited therein. Significantly, with respect to the subject
of this Article, it has been clearly established, as a matter of United States Constitu-
tional law, that the fundamental right of privacy includes the protection of reproductive
choice. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny.
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and specifically mentions the right to health."" Finally, regional
arrangements such as the European Convention and the Ameri-
can Convention expressly protect the rights of health, privacy
and equality.87
In the following sections this Article proposes that repro-
ductive freedom is (or should be) part of the penumbra of rights
embodied in the specific international human rights to privacy,
health and equality found in treaties and in customary law.s8
A. Privacy
The individual right to privacy, as a human right, is articu-
lated in myriad international human rights agreements.8 The
right to privacy in these conventions is expressed in general
terms and, in essence, simply means that individuals have a
human right to privacy or private life. It is accepted that the
notion of privacy is broad in scope, encompassing actions within
the realm of interpersonal relations and acts of individual
autonomy.90
86. Women's Convention, supra note 26. For a detailed discussion of the Women's
Convention, see infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
88. While it must be noted that the human rights treaties nowhere expressly grant a
"right to reproductive choice," this Article discusses why the rights to privacy, health
and equality are appropriate bases for finding a peripheral human right to reproductive
choice. The right is found in human rights instruments based on a non-interpretive anal-
ysis of the express rights of privacy, health and equality - an appropriate and accepted
analysis in international law. See, e.g., Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988)
(where the European Court of Human Rights concluded that criminal laws proscribing
consensual homosexual acts between adults violated the right of privacy under Article 8
of the European Convention); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1981) (where the court simply noted that sexual life is part of private life; specifically,
the court held that under Article 8(1) of the Europeans Convention, the applicant has a
right to "respect for his private life (which includes his sexual life) . . ."). Id. For a
review of the Norris and Dudgeon decisions, see Note, Homosexual Privacy Rights
Before the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights: A
Comparison of Methodologies, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 189 (1990). For an extensive discus-
sion of an analogous analysis - a noninterpretive review of the United States Constitu-
tion, particularly with respect to reproductive choice, see Perry, Noninterpretive Review
in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U.L. REv. 278 (1981).
89. See Universal Declaration, supra note 25, at art. 12; Civil Covenant, supra note
25, at art. 17; European Convention, supra note 25, at art. 8; American Convention,
supra note 25, at art. 11. Significantly, these conventions separately protect the rights of
men and women to found a family. See also European Convention, supra note 25, at art.
12 ("Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a fam-
ily."); American Convention, supra note 25, at art. 17 ("The right of men and women of
marriageable age to marry and to raise a family shall be recognized.").
90. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 49, at 815-17.
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There is ample support in international and domestic judi-
cial decisions that the international human right to privacy,
often linked to family life,91 includes the human right to make
reproductive choices, including abortion. Moreover, the consis-
tent view of scholars is that the broad notion of privacy that
protects personal and interpersonal autonomous decision mak-
ing includes the protection of the right to reproductive choice.92
The well-known decision of the European Commission on
Human Rights in Bruggemann & Scheuten v. Federal Republic
of Germany9" is an example of a decision by an international
91. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); and Morgenthaler, Smoling and Scott v. The
Queen, 44 D.L.R.4th 385 (Can. 1988), are decisions clearly supporting the proposition
that a right to reproductive choice is founded upon the fundamental right of privacy. For
a list of other court decisions in various jurisdictions upholding the right to reproductive
choice (abortion), see Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies, supra note 2. For a discussion
of decisions of international tribunals and domestic courts interpreting the right to pri-
vacy in international agreements as protecting reproductive freedom, see infra notes 93-
115 and accompanying text.
92. See McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights for Women and World Public
Order: The Outline of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 497,504 (1975)
[hereinafter McDougal, Lasswell & Chen]. The authors state that "most of the women in
the world are still denied freedom to control their own fertility because of either legal or
religious prohibitions or the lack of relevant information, resources, and family planning
services." They conclude that such inability to determine the number of children and/or
the interval between each birth has resulted in the deprivation of benefits with respect to
health, education, employment and roles in family and public life - all rights insured in
the various international treaties. See also Cook, U.S. Population Policy Sex Discrimi-
nation, and Principles of Equality Under International Law, 20 INT'L L. & POL. 93,
(1987) [hereinafter Cook, U.S. Population Policy]; Michel, Abortion and International
Law: The Status and Possible Extension of Woman's Right to Privacy, 20 J. FAM. L. 241
(1981) [hereinafter Michel, Abortion and International Law]; Note, Governmental Abor-
tion Policies, supra note 68, at 103, all agreeing that the international right to privacy
encompasses the right to reproductive choice. The convincing thesis of these "highly
qualified publicists," here joined by this author, is itself evidence that the right of pri-
vacy encompasses the right to reproductive choice. See Stat. I.C.J. art. 38(1)(d).
93. Bruggemann & Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
(Reports and Decisions) 100 (1977). The Bruggemann facts arose when, in 1974 the West
German legislative body, the Bundestag, amended the German Criminal Code to legalize
abortions. Law of Apr. 26, 1974, Bundesgesetzblatt BGBI.I 1297 (W. Ger.). The law per-
mitted abortions performed by physicians within the first trimester of pregnancy, pro-
vided that the pregnant women had previously obtained medical and social counseling.
After the first trimester, the law permitted abortion only if necessary to preserve the life
or health of the woman or if there was a strong possibility that the child would be born
with a serious defect. Bruggemann, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. at 103-04. In 1975, however,
the West German Federal Constitutional Court invalidated this new law and held that
because an unborn child has a right to life under the West German Constitution, the
Grundgesetz, the abortion law was contrary to this constitutional mandate. Judgment of
February 25, 1975, 39 BVernG 1 (W. Ger.). The vote was 6-2. Significantly, the German
court recognized that pregnancy falls within the sphere of the woman's private life which
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tribunal that supports the thesis that the right of privacy in-
cludes reproductive freedom.
In Bruggemann two women, citizens of West Germany,
challenged a recent decision of the West German Federal Con-
stitutional Court which invalidated an amendment to the Ger-
man Criminal Code legalizing abortions. They alleged that such
decision violated their rights under the European Convention, in
particular, the right to privacy contained in article 8(1). Signifi-
cantly, Germany had conceded that family planning falls within
the sphere of private and family life but claimed that article 8(2)
of the European Convention allowed interference with privacy
rights to protect the right of the fetus - a claim with which the
Commission ultimately agreed.
In its initial review of the case to decide whether to consider
the merits, however, the European -Commission had held that
pregnancy and its termination were matters of private and fam-
ily life and were therefore within the scope of article 8(1).", The
European Commission further found that "respect for private
life 'comprises also ... the right to establish and ... develop
relationships with other human beings, especially in the emo-
tional field, for the development and fulfillment of one's own
personality.' . . . therefore sexual life is also part of private life
... [and] regulation of abortion is an intervention in private life
,,95
the German constitution protects. Bruggemann, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. at 103-04. The
court also held that the legislature had to enact laws that effectively protect the fetus
throughout pregnancy against attacks from the state or others including the mother. Id.
at 107. Soon after this decision, the West German legislative body enacted conforming
legislation that prohibited abortion absent exceptional circumstances. Law of February
12, 1976, Bundesgesetzblatt 1 1213 (W. Ger.), reprinted in Bruggemann, 10 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. at 107-10. Much has been written on the West German constitutional court's deci-
sion. See, e.g., Morris, Abortion and Liberalism: A Comparison Between The Abortion
Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Constitutional Court of
West Germany, 11 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 159, 161-68 (1988); Cook, U.S. Popu-
lation Policy, supra note 92, at 119-20; Michel, Abortion and International Law, supra
note 92, at 246-51. Note, Governmental Abortion Policies, supra note 68, at 117-21. See
also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1352 n.99 (1988).
94. Bruggemann, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. at 100.
95. Id. at 115. The commission also noted that although regulation of abortion is an
interference with private life it "may or may not be justified under Article 8(2)." Id.
Thereafter, in its decision on the merits, the Commission held that neither the West
German legislature nor the judiciary had breached the article 8 right of privacy in the
European Convention because the government did not impermissibly intrude into the
woman's sphere of privacy. Id. at 117. Significantly, the majority relied on the fact that
at the time the convention had entered into force the abortion laws of all member states
were at least as restrictive as the West German law. Id. at 117.
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Three observations regarding Bruggemann are important.
First, Bruggemann supports the position that the right to pri-
vacy protects reproductive freedom because the issue was not
disputed. Germany, the Commission and the applicants all
agreed that family planning falls within the sphere or penumbra
of the right to privacy. The only quarrel concerned whether
there was any justification, such as protecting the fetus' right to
life, for allowing interference with the conceded right to privacy.
Second, the Commission concluded that the German law
did not unduly interfere with the woman's right of privacy based
upon its review of the domestic abortion laws in existence in the
member countries in 1950. However, in the last twenty years vir-
tually all the European countries parties to the convention have
liberalized their domestic abortion legislation.96 Thus, today the
only conclusion that could be supported by the Commission's
comparative law analysis is that the domestic laws of the mem-
ber states include reproductive freedom as a protected privacy
right.
Third, the Bruggemann majority's conclusion that protec-
tion of fetal life justified interference with the woman's privacy
right - the argument made by Germany and the most prevalent
argument in opposition to reproductive freedom 9 7 - today lacks
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe later affirmed the Commis-
sion's decision using much the same reasoning. Bruggemann & Scheuten v. Federal Re-
public of Germany, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. (Committee of Ministers) 638,
Resolution DH (78) 1. This indicated to the Commission that member states had not
intended the right to privacy contained in article 8 to invalidate the then-existing do-
mestic abortion laws.
A forceful dissent argued that the commencement and termination of pregnancy is
absolutely protected by the right of privacy and family life found in article 8(1). Brug-
gemann, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. at 118. (Fawcett, Commissioner, dissenting). Further,
Commissioner Fawcett noted that an unborn child, not capable of independent life, had
no rights under the Convention and therefore interference with the woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy could not be justified under article 8(2). Id. at 120. The position
of the dissent is in line with the current domestic abortion laws of member states.
96. See infra notes 162-220 and accompanying text (Part III); see also Cook, Abor-
tion Laws and Policies, supra note 2, at 63-64; Henshaw, Induced Abortion, A World
Review, 1990, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 76 (1990) [hereinafter Henshaw, Induced Abortion];
Cook & Dickens, International Developments in Abortion Laws: 1977-88, 78 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1305, 1307 [hereinafter Cook & Dickens, International Developments]; Cook,
U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92; Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7;
Michel, Abortion and International Law, supra note 92, at 251; Cook, International
Dimensions of the Department of Justice Arguments in the Webster Case, 17 LAW,
MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 384 (1989) [hereinafter Cook, International Dimensions].
97. In addition, many countries do not confront the abortion issue because of reli-
gious and moral obstacles to even discussing the question. World Health Organization,
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any foundation as a matter of international law. International
and domestic decisions are clear and uniform: there is no fetal
right to life in international law. Fundamental rights expressed
in human rights agreements, including the right to life,9" are ap-
plicable only to born human beings.9 9 Therefore, as the decisions
discussed below show, such non-existent fetal right to life cannot
compete with, let alone be the basis to deny, reproductive free-
dom as included in the right to privacy.
In 1974, when Austria's 1974 Penal Code provision granting
the right to abortion on request was challenged, the Austrian
Constitutional Court determined that the European Convention
did not recognize fetal right to life.100 The Austrian Government
had argued that the language of article 2 - "everyone's right to
life shall be protected by law"''1 1 - applied to the fetus as well
as to born human beings. The Court, however, refused to include
unborn life in the definition of "everyone." Significantly, the
Abortion Laws, 21 INT'L DIG. OF HEALTH LEGIS. 437 (1970), reprinted in WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, ABORTION LAWS: A SURVEY OF CURRENT WORLD LEGISLATION 4 (1971). For
example, the Catholic Church teaches that the fetus has a soul upon conception giving
the fetus an equal "right to life" as a born human being. See Paul & Schaap, Abortion
and the Law in 1980, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 497, 500-02 (1980); Michel, Abortion and
International Law, supra note 92, at 241; Note, Governmental Abortion Policies, supra
note 68, at 103. Abortion is a mortal sin immediately and automatically subjecting the
woman to excommunication. Interestingly, Catholic theologians are presenting hew theo-
ries on when life begins. Discussions focus on life beginning at implantation rather than
at conception. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1991, § 4, at 5, col. 1. Acceptance of such a
position could have a critical impact on the position of the Catholic Church on abortion
particularly with the availability of new abortifacient drugs such as RU 486. See infra
notes 193, 196 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding such discussions, however, the
Catholic Church continues to exert pressure on states to align their abortion legislation
with the Church's religious opposition to the practice. See, e.g., Poland Ends Subsidies
for Birth Control Pills, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1991, § A, at 11, col. 1 (reporting that while
"60 percent of Poles oppose the bill [banning abortion on which the Polish Parliament is
scheduled to vote next week] several lawmakers say they intend to vote for it in an effort
to please Pope John Paul II, who will visit Poland, his homeland, next month"). The
N.Y. Times also reports that "[s]ince June 1989, when Poland's first non-Communist
leaders .. . took office, elements in the country's Catholic church have been pressuring
for parliamentary adoption of laws reflecting the church's social agenda." Id.
98. American Convention, supra note 25, at art. 1; European Convention, supra
note 25, at art. 2(1); Universal Declaration, supra note 25, at art. 3; Civil Covenant,
supra note 25, at art. 6.
99. See Fox, The American Convention on Human Rights and Prospects for United
States Ratification, 3 HUM. RTS. 243, 263 (1973) [hereinafter Fox].
100. Judgment of October 11, 1974, 39 Band der Sammlunh, 2 Halbjaar 1974,
Erkenntnisse und Beschlfsse des Constitutional Court, Aus., Erklarungen des Verfas-
sungsgerichtshofes 221 (1975); see also Michel, Abortion and International Law, supra
note 92, at 252-53; Cook, International Dimensions, supra note 96, at 384.
101. European Convention, supra note 25, at art. 2.
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Austrian Court, in reaching its decision, considered the domestic
law of member states and noted that the Convention could not
recognize the right to life of the unborn because the law of mem-
ber states did not recognize such rights.0 2 The French Constitu-
tional Court also refused to find a fetal right to life in the Euro-
pean Convention.'0 "
In 1980, in Paton v. United Kingdom, the European Com-
mission interpreted article 2 of the European Convention con-
sistently with the Austrian Constitutional Court's conclusion.0
The Commission stated that "both the general usage of the term
'everyone' . . . in the Convention . . . and in the context in
which this term is employed in Article 2... tend to support the
view that it does not include the unborn."'1 5 Specifically ad-
dressing the question of the juxtaposition of the right to life of a
fetus with the woman's right to choose, the European Commis-
sion concluded that the protection of the life and health of the
woman implicitly limited the right to life of the fetus. 0 6
Similarly, in the Baby Boy case the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights held that the unborn do not have a
protectible right to life.10 7 This decision is significant because
the American Convention provides that the right to life "shall be
protected from the moment of conception."'' 08 Notwithstanding
102. In addition, the Austrian Court noted that the European Convention's prede-
cessor, the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, contained language that implicitly limited the
term "everyone" to born human beings. See Benda, The Impact of Constitutional Law
on the Protection of Unborn Human Life: Some Comparative Remarks, 6 HuM. RTS.
223, 235 (1977).
103. Decision of January 15, 1975, Conseil Constitutionel, D.S. Jur. 529 (Fr.) re-
printed in M. CAPPELLITTI & W. COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 577-79
(1979).
104. See Decision of 13 May 1980 on the admissibility of the application, reprinted
in 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 244 (1980) (Reports and Decisions). The plaintiff sought an
injunction to restrain his wife from having an abortion. The English High Court denied
the injunction and he appealed that decision to the European Commission claiming a
violation of a right to life of the unborn child under article 2 of the European Conven-
tion. The Court upheld the decision that, "in English law, the fetus has no legal 'rights
until it is born and has a separate existence from its mother ... ." Id. at 246-47.
105. Id. at 250.
106. Id. at 252.
107. Case 2141, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 25, OEA/ser. L./V./II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981).
108. American Convention, supra note 25, at art. 4(1) ("[e]very person has a right to
have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.") In fact, the
majority of the delegates of the Organization of American States at the San Jose confer-
ence in Costa Rica construed the words to permit legal abortions; an attempt by repre-
sentatives opposed to abortion to delete the words "and, in general," was defeated. See
1991]
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such language, the Commission concluded that the Convention
does not bar legal abortions. In the Baby Boy case the petitioner
had claimed that Roe v. Wade violated article 4 of the American
Convention by limiting the legal protection of the unborn. 10 9
However, the Commission stated that "it is clear that the peti-
tioners' interpretation of the definition given by the American
Convention on the right of life is incorrect. The addition of the
phrase 'in general, from the moment of conception' does not
mean that the drafters of the convention intended to modify the
concept of the right to life . . .,, 0
Finally, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Chil-
dren's Convention) supports the view that the unborn have no
right to life under international law."' The preamble to the
Children's Convention refers to a human person and the rights
of "everyone" as expressed in other human rights agreements.
The Children's Convention does not explicitly protect an indi-
vidual before birth; 1 2 rather, it defines a child as "every human
being below the age of 18 years . .. " Because the terms "ev-
eryone" and "human being" have been interpreted consistently
in national and international tribunals as referring only to
human beings born alive, such language in the Children's Con-
vention does not, and cannot, include protection of fetal life." 4
In sum, international law clearly recognizes a right to pri-
Fox, supra note 99, at 243.
109. Baby Boy Case, Case 2141, INTER-AM. C.H.R., at 30-32; see also American Con-
vention, supra note 25 and 108. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
(1948), art. 1, Res. XXX, Ninth International Conference of American States, OEA/Ser.
L./V/II.23Doc. 21, Rev. 6 (1948) [hereinafter American Declaration], which provides
that "every human being has a right, liberty and the security of his person." The com-
mission, relying on the preparatory works of the American Declaration, rejected any in-
terpretation of article 1 of the declaration that would have protected unborn life more
stringently than Roe v. Wade. Indeed, the Commission noted that at the conference
phase the question of whether the right to life existed from conception was considered
but language which would clearly have stated that principle was not adopted. Baby Boy
Case, Case 2141, INTER-AM. C.H.R., at 39-41.
f10. Baby Boy Case, Case 2141, INTER-AM. C.H.R., at 42.
111. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 49), U.N. Ioc. A/44/736 (1989) [hereinafter Children's Convention]. See also Al-
ston, The Unborn Child and Abortion Undei the Draft Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 156 (1990) [hereinafter Alston].
112. See, Alston, supra note 111, at 163, 170, 177-78.
113. Children's Convention, supra note 111, at art. 1.
114. See supra notes 104-06 for the decisions of international-tribunals that estab-
lish that the terms "everyone" and "human being" refer only to persons born alive; see
also Alston, supra note 111, at 170 (noting that there is no precedent for interpreting the
terms "child," "human being," or "human person" as including a fetus).
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vacy that encompasses a woman's right to reproductive freedom.
Moreover, there can be no competing rights between the fetus
and a woman;11 5 jurists from diverse states as well as interna-
tional tribunals have concluded that there is no fetal right to life
in international law., Accordingly, the right to reproductive free-
dom must be accepted as part of an individual's international
human right to privacy.
B. Health
A second individual right that provides a basis for finding
an international right to reproductive freedom is the right to
health protected by international human rights treaties includ-
ing the Universal Declaration,1 6 the Economic Covenant,1 the
African Charter118 and the American Declaration.119 State legis-
lation that justifies promoting family planning, abortion, and
voluntary sterilization because of the health benefits accruing to
women and children implicitly recognizes that these reproduc-
tive alternatives form part of a general right to health under in-
ternational law. Thus, an individual's right to health must in-
clude the freedom to choose any of these options.120 Finally, the
115. As one commentator noting that a fetal right to life should not exist has writ-
ten, what "we must ask: Is fetal life more valuable than the life and health of the woman
in whom it is lodged? Should a fetus at any stage of development be granted a higher
moral value than infants and children already born? According to what hierarchy of val-
ues can fetal life be held more important than the lives of those children, or of a teenage
girl carrying an unwanted pregnancy, or of a woman who will undergo a life-threatening
back-alley abortion rather than carry a pregnancy to term?" Macklin, supra note 9, at
41.
116. See Universal Declaration, supra note 25, at art. 25 ("Everyone has a right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services ....
Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance").
117. See Economic Covenant, supra note 26, at art. 12 ("the states parties to the
present covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attaina-
ble standard of physical and mental health").
118. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 16, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/
67/3/Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) ("every individual shall have the
right to enjoy the best obtainable state of physical and mental health").
119. See American Declaration, supra note 109. Article XI provides that "every per-
son has a right to the preservation of his health through sanitary and social measures
relating to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to the extent permitted by public
and community resources."
120. A comprehensive discussion of health benefits and family planning is contained
in CENTER FOR POPULATION AND FAMILY HEALTH, Family Planning: Its Impact on the
Health of Women and Children (1981). As a commentator has noted: "Poorly performed
abortion causes mortality, sterility, and ill health. Illegal abortions waste women's lives
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nexus of family planning to health is acknowledged in the nu-
merous resolutions and declarations that have been concluded
which specifically recognize the right to family planning as a
human right.121
The World Health Organization (WHO) also has declared
that "the right to health is a fundamental human right .... ,122
In addition, both WHO 123 and the United Nations 12' endorse the
basic human entitlement to determine freely the composition of
one's family and recognize that such freedom is inextricably tied
to health. For example, at the 1985 United Nations World Con-
ference on Women, over 150 countries, including the United
States, adopted the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies of Im-
plementation for the Advancement of Women 25 which specify
that:
Appropriate health facilities should be planned, designed, con-
structed and equipped to be readily accessible and acceptable.
Services should be in harmony with the timing and part pat-
tern of women's work, . . . [and] family planning services,
should be within easy reach of all women .... In view of the
unacceptably high levels of maternal mortality in many devel-
oping countries, the reduction of maternal mortality from now
to the year 2000 to a minimum level should be a key target for
and ruin the chances of their families, but preaching and punishment will not stop them.
Given current technology, we need to ask whether permitting such carnage to continue is
human or humane. Documentation of the consequences of legal restrictions on abortion
is desperately needed as a basis for policy reform. Yet opposition to legal abortion has
caused funding for abortion-related research to dry up. Any policy that hinders under-
standing of such a common cause of human suffering and death must be considered un-
acceptable and must be fought vigorously." Sai & Nassim, supra note 65, at 108.
121. See, ISAAcs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at n.29; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 11, Introductory Note 7.
122. World Health Assembly Res. 23.41, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HANDBOOK
OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND THE EXECUTIVE
BOARD 501 (1973).
123. See World Health Organization, Women, Health and Development: A Report
by the Director-General, 90 World Health Organization Pub. at 7 (1985). The definition
of health used by the World Health Organization is "complete physical, mental and so-
cial well-being." Germain, An Overview, supra note 73, at 5.
124. See Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievement
of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace 39, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 116/28/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.85IV.10 (1986). Since 1968 the United
Nations has recognized and repeatedly reiterated the right of individuals to decide freely
and responsibly the number and spacing of their children. See Germain, An Overview,
supra note 73, at 4 (citing INTERNATIONAL PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION, THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO FAMILY PLANNING (1989)).
125. U.N. Doc. A/Conf./116/28/Rev. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Nairobi Strategies].
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Governments and non-governmental organizations, including
professional organizations. 2 '
The following statistics clearly show that denial of repro-
ductive freedom imperils the fundamental right to health: 127
Worldwide there are some ten to twenty million clandestine
abortions every year.12s
Clandestine abortions result in 50 deaths per 100,000 proce-
dures in developed countries and about 400 deaths per 100,000
in developing countries. 129
126. Nairobi Strategies, supra note 125, at 155.
127. For a discussion on the effect on maternal health of restrictive abortion poli-
cies, see Hartmann, The Impact of the Reagan Administration's International Popula-
tion Policy on Human Rights Relating to Health and the Family, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 169 (1987); Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92; Cook, Reducing Mater-
nal Mortality: A Priority for Human Rights Law, in S. McLEAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 185 (1989) [hereinafter Cook, Reducing Maternal Mortality]; Women's
Health in the Third World: The Impact of Unwanted Pregnancy 1989 INT'L J. GYNECOL-
OGY & OBSTETRICS (Supp. 3); A. GERMAIN & J. ORDWAY, POPULATION CONTROL AND
WOMEN'S HEALTH: BALANCING THE SCALES (1989); Int'l Women's Health Coalition, Repro-
ductive Choice in Jeopardy: International Policy Perspectives, Presentations at the Bien-
nial Conference of the Association for Women in Development Washington, D.C. (April,
1987); Law & Rackner, Gender Equality and the Mexico City Policy, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L
L. & POL. 193, 193 n.1 (1987).
128. Sai & Nassim, supra note 65, at 107 (citing Henshaw, Induced Abortion: A
Worldwide Perspective, 13 INT'L FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 12 (1987)). On the other hand world-
wide there are 30 to 40 million legally induced abortions each year. This means that the
abortion rate is between 37 and 55 abortions per 1,000 women aged 15 to 44 and an
abortion ratio of 24 to 32 for 100 pregnancies. Stated differently, every year between
three and six percent of women of reproductive age undergo abortion, and one in four
pregnancies is terminated in such a way.
129. Sai & Nassim, supra note 65, at 107 (citations omitted). By contrast mortality
in legal abortions is two per 100,000 procedures in industrialized countries and 6 per
100,000 procedures in developing countries. Although information on clandestine abor-
tions is difficult to get and therefore uncertain, the following estimates of clandestine
abortions have been generally accepted: "500,000 in Bangladesh, 600,000 in the rest of
South Asia, 1.5 million in the rest of Asia, 400,000 for Rumania, 1.5 million for Africa
and approximately 2 million in the Soviet Union and 4 million each in India and Latin
America" - totally 15 million clandestine abortions. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra
note 96, at 81. Henshaw notes, however, that the uncertainty of the estimates suggest the
numbers could be as low as 10 million or as high as 22 million placing the estimated
worldwide total abortions between 36 and 53 million yielding annual rate of 32 to 46
abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age. Id. at 80. An example of the tragic effects
on health of restrictions on reproductive choice is Rumania. Here, most abortions were
prohibited in 1966, and between 1965 and 1984 abortion mortality rose from 21 to 128
deaths per 100,000 life births. Id. at 82. Over this same period, maternal mortality from
other causes fell from 65 deaths to 21 deaths per 100,000 life births. Id. (citations omit-
ted). In 1984 alone the World Health Organization reports that there were 449 abortion
deaths in Rumania. Id. Important reductions in mortality could be achieved simply by
assuring that safe services are available and accessible for women who qualify for them.
Sai & Nassim, supra note 65, at 110.
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Studies in Latin America, where it is estimated that one in
three women has an abortion, show that complications of ille-
gal abortion account for as much as 30-40% of maternal
deaths.""0
One of the largest causes of maternal death is unskilled abor-
tions and lack of safe contraceptive devices"' with 25-50% of
maternal deaths being due to botched abortions3 2 including an
estimated 200,000 or more Third World women.1 33
Lack of reproductive health care, including abortion services,
results in maternal and infant illness and death.1 34
WHO estimates that 99% of the 500,000 annual maternal
deaths occur in developing countries. 135
High maternal mortality ratios are compounded by high fertil-
ity. In Africa there is an average of eight live births per woman
and thus probably at least ten pregnancies per woman making
a lifetime risk for dying from pregnancy related causes "greater
than one in twenty. 1 36
In some African countries as many as 25-40% of women have
their first child before age eighteen, a group with high risk of
maternal mortality.1 7
130. Sai & Nassim, supra note 65, at 107 (citations omitted).
131. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 106.
132. Germain, An Overview, supra note 73, at 1; Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies,
supra note 2, at 67 (citations omitted).
133. Germain, An Overview, supra note 73, at 1.
134. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 104. Conversely, availability of
such services can reduce maternal as well a infant mortality and result in healthy family
life. Id.
135. Cook, Reducing Maternal Mortality, supra note 127, at 187 (citing WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MATERNAL MORTALITY RATES: A TABULATION OF AVAILABLE INFOR-
MATION, 2 (1986)). Of these 500,000 deaths, it is estimated that 20-50% could be averted
simply by providing access to safe abortion and contraceptive services. Id. at 189. (citing
Mahler, The Safe Motherhood Initiative: A Call to Action, 670 The Lancet (1987) [here-
inafter Mahler, The Safe Motherhood Initiative]. Of the 500,000 maternal deaths it is
estimated that 115,000-204,000 result from complications of illegal abortions performed
by unqualified practitioners. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 81 (citations
omitted). Henshaw notes that a more conservative estimate could be derived from hospi-
tal studies that suggest that on an average 20-25% of maternal mortality is attributable
to abortion (citation omitted) yielding totals of 100,000 to 125,000 deaths annually from
illegal abortion. Id. His review of the literature found that the highest reported mortality
rate was 2,400 deaths per 100,000 in the rural area of Bangladesh. Id. (citation omitted).
In industrialized countries the average lifetime risk of a woman dying of pregnancy-re-
lated causes is between 1 in 4,000 to 1 in 10,000; for a woman in developing countries it is
between 1 in 15 and 1 in 50. Id.
136. Cook, Reducing Maternal Mortality, supra note 127, at 188 (citing WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MATERNAL MORTALITY RATES: A TABULATION OF AVAILABLE INFOR-
MATION, 2 (1986)); Sai & Nassim, supra note 65, at 106 (citations omitted).
137. Mashalaba, Commentary on the Causes and Consequences of Unwanted Preg-
nancy from an African Perspective, 1989 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 15 (Supp.
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Pregnancies that come too early or too late in reproductive
lives, too close to another pregnancy, or too frequently, raise
rates of maternal mortality.138
Maternal health affects child and infant survival: a mother's
death in childbirth could prejudice the child's chance of sur-
vival; 139 children born to very young mothers are more likely to
die;140 close birth spacing is a risk to children,14 1 with young
children suffering higher infant mortality rates if born less
than two years after a previous birth."42
This data shows that the availability of safe, effective and ac-
ceptable contraception and family planning, including safe preg-
nancy termination services, is necessary to achieve the funda-
mental right to health. 143
In sum, there can be no quarrel that protecting reproductive
freedom, including safe abortion services, promotes the funda-
mental right to health by reducing maternal and infant mortal-
ity.14 4 In fact, WHO, as part of its efforts to reduce maternal
3) [hereinafter Mashalaba]. In Africa, hospital studies show the complications of illegal
abortions are a major public health problem. "For example, Jomo Kenyata Hospital in
Nairobi, Kenya treats 50-60 women a day for abortion complications." Similarly, "a com-
munity-based study in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia found that 24% of all maternal deaths
and 54% of those directly related to pregnancy were attributable to complications of
clandestine abortions." Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 81 (citations
omitted).
138. Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies, supra note 2, at 67 (citations omitted); Sai
& Nassim, supra note 65, at 105, 106.
139. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 112.
140. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 112 (citations omitted).
Mothers under 16 years of age are twice as likely to lose their babies as those over 20
years of age. Id.
141. Cook, Reducing Maternal Mortality, supra note 127, at 191-92 (citing D.
MAINE & R. MCNAMARA, BIRTH SPACING AND CHILD SURVIVAL 17 (1985)); see also Cook,
U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 112. For example, older children may be
weaned too early. Id.
142. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 113. Mortality rates for chil-
dren aged 1 and 2 are up to four times higher if their birth was followed by another
within 18 months. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 112-13 (citation
omitted).
143. Sai & Nassim, supra note 65, at 108-10.
144. For example, family planning reduces the number of pregnancies thereby low-
ering the lifetime risk of maternal death and averts high risk pregnancies. Cook, U.S.
Population Policy, supra note 92, at 107 (citing D. MINE, A. ROSENFIELD, M. WALLACE,
A. KIMBALL, B. KwAsT, E. PAPIERNIK, S. WHITE, PREVENTION OF MATERNAL DEATHS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PROGRAM OPTIONS AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS (1987), 4-12
(background paper prepared for the International Safe Motherhood Conference, Nairobi,
February 10-13, 1987). Women in the following categories have a higher risk associated
with pregnancy: women less than 18 years of age; women older than 34 years of age;
women who last gave birth within the prior 24 months; women who have had four or
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mortality, especially in the Third World, has emphasized the
need to publicize the availability of legal and safe abortions. The
United States specifically has recognized the relationship be-
tween uncontrolled fertility and poor health.
145
Conversely, the absence of adequate health care services ex-
poses mothers and children to illness and death."4 " Given the
fundamental right to health and the clear nexus between family
planning and health of mothers and children, protection of re-
productive freedom as a human right promotes the fundamental
right to health and should be an integral part of that right.
C. Equality
The third general individual right that provides the basis of
recognizing the peripheral human right to reproductive freedom
is the right to equality. This right is contained in numerous in-
ternational human rights agreements, 47  particularly the
Women's Convention, an entire treaty dedicated to the proscrip-
tion of discriminatory conduct against women,14 8 which makes
more births; women from rural areas with limited access to reproductive health services;
and women with unwanted pregnancies who would be prone to obtain unskilled abor-
tions. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 107 (citing Rinehart & Kols,
Healthier Mothers and Children Through Family Planning, 27 POPULATION REP. 657,
659 (1984)). Many unwanted pregnancies are high risk, since the women often deny the
pregnancy until very late, fail to seek prenatal and delivery care, and/or try to abort the
pregnancy in unsafe conditions such as when it is legally restricted and is done by un-
trained practitioners. Germain, An Overview, supra note 73, at 2; Sai & Nassim, supra
note 65.
145. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 103. In fact, the United States
policy statement provided:
Perhaps the most poignant consequence of rapid population growth is its effect
on the health of mothers and children. Especially in poor countries, the health
and nutrition status of women and children is linked to family size. Maternal
and infant mortality rises with the number of births and with births too closely
spaced.
Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 103, (quoting Policy Statement of the
United States of America at the United Nations International Conference on Popula-
tion (Second Session), 10 Pop. & DEV. REv. 576, 583 (1984)).
146. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92, at 104.
147. See U.N. CHARTER preamble, art. 1(3), Universal Declaration, supra note 25, at
art. 2; Civil Covenant, supra note 25, at art. 2(1); Economic Covenant, supra note 26, at
art. 2(2); American Convention, supra note 25, at art. 1(1); European Convention, supra
note 26, at art. 14.
148. As of 1986 the Women's Convention had been ratified by 87 states and signed
by a number of others including the United States. In 1980, President Reagan submitted
to the Senate the Women's Convention but the Senate has not yet consented to the
convention and thus it is not yet ratified by the United States. However, the domestic
laws of the United States prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. See infra note 154.
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freedom from discrimination on the grounds of sex a basic
human right in international law. Article 1 of the Women's Con-
vention broadly defines the proscribed conduct as:
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective
of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the po-
litical, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.149
Particularly pertinent to the analysis of reproductive free-
dom as a human right are the provisions in the various human
rights agreements that obligate state parties to assure men and
women "the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the
number and spacing of their children and to have access to the
information, education and means to enable them to exercise
these rights."150 Such right to have a family must include not
only the right to have children but also the right not to. Thus
for women and men to have the right to plan a family they must
have the right to make reproductive choices including the right
to terminate a pregnancy for health, economic, social, cultural or
other reasons.
The right to reproductive freedom is tied inextricably to
women's equality by permitting women to enjoy their interna-
tionally protected right to equality: to participate, equally with
men, in the social, economic, and political lives of their coun-
tries.151 International policy statements are in accord with such
149. Women's Convention, supra note 26, at art. 1.
150. Women's Convention, supra note 26, at art. 16. See also Universal Declaration,
supra note 25, at art. 16(1) ("Men and women... have the right to marry and found a
family."). Civil Covenant, supra note 25, at art. 23(3) ("the right of men and women of
marriageable age to marry and found a family shall be recognized"); European Conven-
tion, supra note 25, at art. 12 ("Men and women.., have a right to marry and to found
a family ...."); American Convention, supra note 25, at art. 17(2) ("The right of men
and women ... to marry and raise a family shall be recognized ... ."). It is significant
to recognize that the right to obtain an abortion belongs to the woman. For example, in
judicial interpretations in Canada, England, France, Israel, the United States, and Yugo-
slavia courts have stated that husbands do not have any role in the woman exercising her
right irrespective of the admission of paternity. Cook & Dickens, International Develop-
ments, supra note 96, at 1307 (citations omitted). Significantly, the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights upheld the English decision, thereby making this principle appli-
cable to other state signatories to that convention. Id. at 1307.
151. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 92, at 504. For a listing of the various
agreements expressly granting women the right to equality, see supra note 27 and ac-
companying text.
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views. For example, the Nairobi Strategies recognize that "[tihe
ability of women to control their own fertility forms an impor-
tant basis for the enjoyment of other rights ...."'
Moreover, "freedom from gender discrimination as state
policy . . may already be a principle of customary interna-
tional law. ' 153 In fact, the domestic laws of most states, includ-
ing the United States, 1" mandate equality for or prohibit dis-
crimination against women generally or in various respects.
While it cannot be disputed that some states do practice gender
based discrimination "[tihe fact that the prohibition of [sex dis-
crimination] is often honored in the breach does not diminish its
binding effect as a norm of international law.1
1 55
Finally, both jurists and scholars agree that for women, the
right to equality must include reproductive freedom. The argu-
ment that women's international human right to equality must
include the right to make reproductive choices was clearly ar-
ticulated by Justice Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Morgenthaler, Smoling and Scott v. The Queen:156
[T]he history of the struggle for human rights from the eight-
eenth century on has been the history of men struggling to as-
sert their dignity and common humanity against an overbear-
ing state apparatus. The more recent struggle for women's"
rights has been a struggle to eliminate discrimination, to
achieve a place for women in a man's world, to develop a set of
legislative reforms in order to place women in the same posi-
152. Nairobi Strategies, supra note 125, at 158. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra
note 92, at 123. One commentator has noted that regardless of prohibitions against abor-
tion, women will resort to it for their own sake and the sake of their children. "They
know that reproductive freedom is fundamental to their liberty and self-determination,
as well as to responsible parenthood, and are willing to risk dying for it. Abortion is an
act of self-defense for women whose health, dignity or basic rights are threatened by an
unwanted pregnancy. Abortion is also an act of mercy, motivated by women's concern for
their children's well-being. Abortion is an act of subversion against restrictive abortion
laws made predominantly by men." Germain, An Overview, supra note 73, at 3 (citations
omitted).
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 702 comment I; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 11, § 701 Reporter's Note 6.
154. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amends. XIV, XIX (prohibiting sex discrimination with
respect to voting). Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973).
155. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 n.15 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The fact
that the prohibition of torture is often honored in the breach does not diminish its bind-
ing effect as a norm of international law."). The United States Department of State ac-
knowledged that the violation of rights does not preclude the validity of the rights. Id. at
884.
156. 44 D.L.R.4th 385 (Can. 1988).
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tion as men. It has not been a struggle to define the rights of
women in relation to their special place in the societal struc-
ture in relation to the biological distinction between the two
sexes. Thus, women's needs and aspirations are only now being
translated into protected rights. The right to reproduce or not
to reproduce. . is one such right and is properly perceived as
an integral part of a modern woman's struggle to assert her
dignity and worth as a human being.157
Commentators have explained why reproductive freedom is
necessary for women's equality. One writer has noted that safe
and early abortions are essential to create a world where women
are treated as fully equal human beings, not only as mothers,
and where women will receive the respect and dignity to which
they are entitled under international human rights laws.158 An-
other suggests that denial of the right to reproductive choice vio-
lates a woman's right to control the number and spacing of her
children.159
In sum, any proscriptions against reproductive freedom im-
permissibly deny a woman's right to equality by reinforcing
women's traditional roles in childbearing and childrearing, con-
tinuing their dependency on men or on the state, and effectively
foreclosing their economic development. 60 "The inability to 'de-
cide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of chil-
dren (if any)' has. . . deprived many women of benefits regard-
ing their health, education or employment and their roles in
family and public life."' Without the right to reproductive
freedom women are deprived of their right to equal participation
in the social, economic, educational and cultural affairs of the
state in derogation of their international human rights. Thus,
considering the relationship of reproduction to women's exercise
of these rights, the right to equality must include the right to
157. Id. at 491 (emphasis in original) (citing Burrows, International Law and
Human Rights: the Case of Women's Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM RHETORIC TO RE-
ALiTY (T. Campbell, D. Goldberg, S. McLean & T. Mullon 1st. ed. 1986)).
158. Germain, An Overview, supra note 73, at 2.
159. Macklin, supra note 9, at 42.
160. See Michel, Abortion and International Law, supra note 92, at 258-60. For
other scholars' arguments that the right to equality protects the right to reproductive
choice, see, Cook, U.S. Population Policy, supra note 92; Note, Governmental Abortion
Policies, supra note 68, at 124-25; Germain, An Overview, supra note 73, at 2 ("[slafe
early abortion services are essential to create a world that is both respectful of and safe
for girls and women as fully equal human beings, not only as a mother").
161. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 92, at 504.
1991]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
reproductive freedom.
III. DOMESTIC ABORTION LAWS ESTABLISH A PARTICULAR HUMAN
RIGHT To REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
OR CUSTOMARY LAW
A. An Overview
International law recognizes that trends in domestic laws
can establish international norms. For example, that torture was
illegal under domestic laws was a factor in finding a proscription
against torture in international law." 2 Similarly, in Bruggemann
the European Commission, in deciding whether German law vio-
lated a regional human rights agreement, considered the domes-
tic law of member states. 163 Likewise, the Austrian Constitu-
tional Court looked at the domestic laws of the member states of
the European Commission to decide that the term "everyone" in
the European Convention did not include the unborn.6 4 Thus,
in analyzing the existence of the human right to reproductive
freedom a review of domestic laws upon which such a right can
be based is appropriate.
One scholar's exhaustive review of domestic laws reveals the
following pattern:
From the second half of the 19th century through World War
H, abortion was highly restricted almost everywhere. Liberali-
zation of abortion laws occurred in most of the countries of
Eastern and Central Europe in the 1950s and in almost all the
remaining developed countries during the 1960s and 1970s. A
few developing countries also relaxed their restrictions on abor-
tion during the same period, most notably China and India. By
mid-1986, abortions could be legally obtained for health rea-
sons in North America and in every European country except
Belgium and the Republic of Ireland. s5
162. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980). These domestic laws
can be an independent source of law. Stat. I.C.J. art. 38(1)(c), or evidence of customary
law. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
163. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
165. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 78. Belgium now allows abor-
tions if the woman is "in distress" - a notion liberally interpreted in France. A number
of smaller countries have also liberalized their laws. In the Western World, specifically in
Australia and New Zealand, the changes were in part due to the prevalence of the prac-
tice of abortion which resulted in health risks, mortality and morbidity. P. SACHDEV,
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON ABORTION 3 (1988) [hereinafter P. SACHDEV].
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At present, more than three quarters of the world's popula-
tion resides in countries with laws that reflect the right to the
most controversial of reproductive choices - a woman's right to
obtain an induced abortion. 66 Significantly, states that have en-
acted such laws represent all cross-sections of the international
world - developed and developing countries; rich and poor
countries; states of diverse races and religions. This worldwide
liberalization trend 6 7 regarding abortion establishes reproduc-
tive freedom as a "general principle of law recognized by civi-
lized nations."'6 8 Moreover, these laws establish reproductive
freedom as international custom by reflecting obligatory state
practice.
In considering the practice of states it is significant that
abortion is universally practiced. 6 9 Even where some states' do-
166. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 1. The right to an abortion is not without pa-
rameters, and conditions range from abortion on request to some restrictive practices.
For example, of countries with populations over 1 million, 40% of the world's population
lives in countries where induced abortion is permitted on request; 25% only if the wo-
man's life is in danger; 12% permit abortion for other maternal health reasons; and 23%
allow the procedure on both social and social medical grounds. Henshaw, Induced Abor-
tion, supra note 96, at 76-77. For purposes of establishing the human right to reproduc-
tive freedom, however, variations in the practice of nations as evidenced inter alia in
their domestic laws which as a whole affirmatively recognize the right to reproductive
choice, are not a concern. To be sure, provisions establishing the right to an abortion
vary greatly. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 2. However, the diverging breadth of prac-
tices only goes to the scope of the human right but not to its existence. In this respect it
is noteworthy that uniform practice is not required to establish the custom. Significantly,
even variance from the practice does not signify that a rule of customary international
law does not exist. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 n.15 ("the fact that the prohibition of
torture is often honored in the breach does not diminish its binding effect as a norm of
international law"). See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 11, § 701 comment I
where commentators note that "freedom from gender discrimination ... in many mat-
ters, may already be a principle of customary international law" based upon, inter alia,
the domestic laws of many states as well as various international agreements which pro-
hibit discrimination against women.
167. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 1, 10; Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note
96, at 76, 78-79; Cook & Dickens, International Development, supra note 96; Cook,
Abortion Laws and Policies, supra note 2; Cook & Dickens, A Decade of International
Change in Abortion Law: 1967-1977, 68 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 637 (1978); Isaacs, Repro-
ductive Rights, supra note 7, at 312.
168. Such "general principles" are, independently, a source of international law. In
addition, they are evidence of customary law. See supra notes 80-161 and accompanying
text.
169. Ladipo, Preventing and Managing Complications of Induced Abortion in
Third World Countries, 1989 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBsTETRIcs 21, 23 (Supp. 3) [here-
inafter Ladipo]; Samil, Commentary on Menstrual Regulation ,as a Health Service:
Challenges in Indonesia, 1989 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 29 (Supp. 3) [hereinaf-
ter Samil].
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mestic laws do not condone the procedure, the practice is sys-
tematically to ignore any restrictions. 170 Records show that in-
duced abortion has been practiced to terminate unwanted
pregnancy in all cultures since history has been recorded.
Western countries recognize the right to reproductive free-
dom based upon "social, political and demographic factors' '7 1
including women's rights and maternal health care issues. 172 For
example, these states take into account that clandestine abor-
tions result in complications and create serious public health
problems.173
Like the Western world, Eastern European countries ac-
cepted the right to reproductive freedom, particularly abortion,
because the regular practice of illegal abortions resulted in
health risks such as maternal mortality and morbidity. 74 These
countries followed the Soviet Union's lead which in 1920 permit-
ted abortion on demand. 75
The liberalization trend of the laws also was influenced by
the medical professions which recognized the health dangers of
restrictive regulations.1 76 In addition, human rights groups, in
accordance with international law, 77 have advocated the right of
170. See, e.g., Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 341.
171. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 3. Many of these factors can also be used to
support the non-interpretive reading of express human rights (as found in the myriad
human rights documents presented in Part II, above) that establish the penumbral right
to reproductive choice in the express health, privacy and equality provisions of interna-
tional agreements. See also Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96; Cook & Dickens,
International Developments, supra note 96.
172. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 313. In recognizing the right to
reproductive choice, states acknowledge the existence of the practice and its health risks
such as high maternal mortality or morbidity as well as infant mortality. P. SACHDEV,
supra note 165, at 3.
173. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 341 n.181.
174. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 4.
175. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 4. The Soviet Union's policy, however, fluctu-
ated with the state's perceived needs to increase its population. See supra note 166 and
accompanying text. Similarly, East Germany's policies have fluctuated, at times having
restrictive laws and at other times having very liberal laws. These laws were dependent
upon the government's perceived need to increase or decrease its population. After
World War II, the curb on the right was initially relaxed to deal with the problem of the
increase in illegal abortions and the consequent health problems. However, in 1950, a
more restrictive governmental control was installed. Approximately fifteen years later
the right was more broadly recognized and in 1972 abortion on request was recognized.
P. SACHDE v, supra note 165, at 4.
176. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 3.
177. For a discussion of the international law protecting the right to reproductive
choice, see supra notes 71-161 and accompanying text.
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each individual to control his or her own fertility.178
In reviewing the trend towards uniform recognition of the
right to reproductive freedom, an examination of the reasons for
government regulation is instructive. In the Western world, pro-
hibition of abortion was based on religious grounds: the Catholic
Church's condemnation of abortion or any form of
contraception. 179
In contrast, regulation in the Eastern European states was
government-driven.180 Non-socialist European states used the
enactment of abortion restrictions to stimulate population
growth when a sharp decline in birth rates threatened the labor
force. On the other hand, some governments relaxed restrictions
on family planning based upon the state's desire to curb popula-
tion growth. In fact, in countries such as China and Korea, gov-
ernments provide incentives to encourage abortions as a means
of fertility regulation."'
178. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 3.
179. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 3. On the other hand, without the Catholic
Church's opposition, such acceptance of abortion has been easier in other jurisdictions.
For example, in Bangladesh and Korea religious fundamentalists' opposition was si-
lenced by avoiding enactment on liberal grounds, but in practice restrictive regulations
are systematically ignored and abortion is performed as a routine practice. Id. at 3-4. See
also Michel, Abortion and International Law, supra note 92, at 1; Note, Governmental
Abortion Policies, supra note 68, at 103.
180. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 4. Notably Czechoslovakia (1973) and Hungary
(1974) took such measures. Since 1986 all of the restrictions have been repealed. Signifi-
cantly, Eastern and Central European countries, except for East Germany, have relied
on abortion, which is seen as the most efficient solution to pregnancy, as a method of
contraception, most likely because modern contraceptive methods are not readily availa-
ble in these regions. Id.
181. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 2. For example, in China the official policy is for
a one-child family. Id. Consequently, abortion is viewed as one of four family planning
operations, the other three being vasectomy, tubal ligation and the insertion of an IUD.
Id. In Korea, on the other hand, abortion is widely practiced despite restrictive laws. The
Korean Government does, however, encourage abortions by providing subsidies to pri-
vate clinics that perform abortions concurrently with sterilization or where the preg-
nancy resulted from IUD failure. Id. at 2-3.
Contrary to the practice in China some countries concerned with dbcreasing popula-
tion use incentives to encourage people to have more children. Isaacs, Reproductive
Rights, supra note 7, at 313. Recently Japan instituted such monetary incentives to have
more children in an attempt to counteract the declining birth rate. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1991, at Al, col. 3. Japan, considered to have one of the most permissive abortion sys-
tems in the world, has an abortion rate of 21.5 per 1000 women. P. SACHDEV, supra note
165, at 8. This rate, which is attributable to widespread and effective contraception, has
been steadily falling since peaking in 1955. Id. The decline in Japan's abortion rate is
also a result of the government's emphasis on comprehensive family planning, education,
and dissemination of contraceptive devices. Id. at 4, 8. But see Henshaw, Induced Abor-
tion, supra note 96, Table 2 at 78 estimating the rate in Japan at 18.6 per 1000 based on
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From 1977 to 1988, legislative reforms throughout the inter-
national community provided further access to abortion '8 2
thereby creating additional support for the theory that the right
to reproductive freedom has become an international human
right. In this period, aside from recognizing standard health rea-
sons for abortion, several countries authorized other grounds
such as family welfare. 8 3 Finally, many countries deal with
abortion as part of comprehensive family planning programs. 184
statistic but at 84 per 1000 based on survey data.
This author's thesis denounces all coercive abortion legislation as a violation of the
human right to reproductive freedom. Any state practice that forecloses the individual's
exercise of his or her right to reproductive choice in pursuit of a state objective to con-
trol population - either increase or decrease growth - constitutes an impermissible
interference with an internationally protected right. Of course, denial of the individual's
reproductive freedom by state practice that cedes to religious ideology is similarly viola-
tive of an individual's human rights.
182. Cook & Dickens, International Developments, supra note 96, at 1305. Only five
countries narrowed the grounds for abortion and these states still recognized the right
within certain parameters. For example, Honduras and Peru proposed penal code provi-
sions that would have allowed abortions only to save the life and health of the woman
and in cases of rape and fetal deformity. In Honduras, however, abortions sought for
these reasons were thought to violate a provision in the 1982 constitution stating that
"the right to life is inviolable." Id. In Peru, the 1979 constitution "protects the right to
life of one 'about to be born,' but also provides that the state respects responsible
parenthood." Id. at 1309. Israel liberalized the grounds for abortion when it changed its
law in 1977, but two years later removed socio-economic indications therefor; Rumania,
which limited socio-economic grounds for exercising the right to abortion for women over
45; and Finland, which reduced the statutory limit on performing abortions from 16 to
12 weeks absent a physical defect in the woman. In 1985 Finland changed the laws fur-
ther to permit procedures before 25 weeks in case of serious disease or disability of the
fetus. Id. at 1305.
183. Cook & Dickens, International Developments, supra note 96, at 1305. Hungary
permits abortions where the pregnant woman is single or has been separated for six
months, where appropriate housing is lacking or where a woman is age 35 and above and
has had three deliveries. Id. French Polynesia permits abortion where the pregnant wo-
man has Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, or is sero-positive for the Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus. Id. Hong Kong recognizes adolescence alone as grounds for an
abortion. France, Belgium and the Netherlands allow abortion if the woman is "in dis-
tress" with respect to her pregnancy. Cyprus, Italy and Taiwan permit abortion on gen-
eral family welfare grounds. Id.
184. Cook & Dickens, International Developments, supra note 96, at 1308. For a
thorough discussion of many Western countries' comprehensive approach to family plan-
ning, see M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES,
EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1987). While this author agrees with Professor Glendon's view
that a comprehensive approach to family planning is desirable, she disagrees with Pro-
fessor Glendon's view that the United States' approach is inadequate. Rather, as this
Article shows, the United States' approach, like most of the world's, clearly recognizes
the human right reproductive freedom. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
The following are examples of comprehensive family planning approaches by some
states: Italian law requires local and regional authorities to promote contraceptive ser-
vices in order to reduce the demand for abortion, Cook & Dickens, International Devel-
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These few examples show that, worldwide, states have rec-
ognized the right to reproductive freedom in diverse ways. Vari-
ation in the domestic laws notwithstanding, it is clear that the
general principles of law common to civilized nations, as well as
the actual state practice of states, establish reproductive free-
dom as an international human right.
B. Domestic Laws and State Practice Universally Recognize
Reproductive Freedom as a Particular Human Right
Nearly forty percent of the world's population lives in juris-
dictions where the right to reproductive choice can be exercised
on request.185 The examples of several of these states are note-
worthy as showing the unequivocal trend over the last decades
to recognize the right to reproductive freedom.
In the Soviet Union the right to an abortion has existed
since 1920 and has been absolute since 1955.186 Under Soviet law
opments, supra note 96, at 1308; Czechoslovakia seeks to prevent abortion by sex educa-
tion and provides free contraceptives, id.; Luxembourg even provides contraceptive
services to minors free of charge, id.; French law requires that the institution performing
the abortion provide the woman with birth control information, id.
185. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 2; Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96,
at 76-77. This is particularly true during the first trimester, although the time restric-
tions are inapplicable for induced abortions performed for medical reasons even up to
and beyond the twentieth week. Countries in this category include the African countries
of Togo and Tunisia; the Asian countries of China, Turkey, Singapore and Vietnam;
Cuba, Canada, Puerto Rico and the U.S. in North America; and in Europe, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, It-
aly, the Netherlands, Norway, Rumania, Soviet Union, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Id. at
Table 1; Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies, supra note 2, at Table 1; P. SACHD v, supra
note 165, at Table 1.1. Cook and Henshaw do not include Bulgaria, Finland or Great
Britain in this category. However, given the practice in those jurisdictions, this writer
agrees with Isaacs that the right in those states can be exercised on request. Isaacs, Re-
productive Rights, supra note 7, at 342-47. Also, in Hungary, abortion on request is
available for women over 40 and in Romania for women over 45. Id. at 342 n.182. In
Hungary women have a right to abortion on request if they are married with two living
children. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 79. The two living children re-
quirement was reduced from at least three children. As in prior years, the right to abor-
tion is based upon health, fetal defect or juridical indications. In addition, the right is
based upon the woman having inadequate housing, or her being older than 35, unmar-
ried, or separated for at least six months. But women who do not meet such conditions
may still apply for approval if they have some other "social reason" for terminating the
pregnancy. Id. (citations omitted). The abortion trends in nordic countries (Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden) - all in this "on request category" - are telling. After an
initial increase in the abortion rates following the liberalization of the laws, rates have
been steadily dropping. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 6-7.
186. Edict of Nov. 23, 1955, Ved Verk. Soy. SSSR, no. 22, item 425, (Edict of the
Prosidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.), translated in Soy. STAT. & DEC.,
Spring 1968, at 47 (unofficial translation). The Soviet Union also has broadened the
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an abortion. must be performed in a state hospital to be legal
and the only existing penalties pertain to doctors who perform
abortions anywhere other than in state hospitals.18
In Britain the reform occurred in late 1967 when Parliament
passed a bill authorizing abortion on broad grounds.188 Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, which are similar to the United
Kingdom in political and social perspectives, were influenced by
the actions of the British Parliament and followed Britain's lead
in recognizing the right to abortions on broad grounds.189
In 1973 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that
a woman's right to obtain an abortion was a fundamental pri-
vacy right.190 In 1983 the Supreme Court reconfirmed this ruling
in Akron, stating that the right to privacy encompasses the right
to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy' 9' and in May of
1991 the Supreme Court referred to abortion as one of a "wo-
man's Fifth Amendment rights."' 2
In 1975 the French legislature passed the Voluntary Termi-
nation of Pregnancy Act and, with a few modifications, reen-
acted the law in 1979 recognizing the right to abortion on broad
grounds.19 3 More recently, in 1988, the French government au-
grounds for second trimester abortions to include social indications. Henshaw, Induced
Abortion, supra note 96, at 79. Reportedly, the purpose of broadening the restrictions
was to reduce the number of illegal abortions. Id. (citations omitted).
187. See Note, The Law of Abortion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the People's Republic of China: Women's Rights in Two Socialist Countries, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1027, 1053 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Abortion in the USSR and China]. Under
current Soviet law, women may decide whether to have an abortion which is permitted
upon request within the first twelve weeks of conception and does not require specific
juridical or socio-economic grounds. Id. at 1060. In 1979 the procedural requirements for
abortion included the consent of the woman, performance of the abortion in a hospital or
other lawful establishment, and a small fee in the cases of legal abortions undertaken for
other than medical reasons. Neither a doctor's consent nor a committee's approval is
required. Id.
188. Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, §§ 1, reprinted in 19 INT'L DIo. HEALTH LEGIs. 887
(1968). The act affirms the right to an abortion if "the continuance of the pregnancy
would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman. . .[and] [iun determining whether
the continuance of a pregnancy would involve such risk of injury to health . . . account
may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonable foreseeable environment."
Abortion Act §§ (1)(a), (2).
189. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 3.
190. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973). See supra notes 4-5 for the develop-
ment of the law in the United States.
191. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
192. Rust v. Sullivan, 59 U.S.L.W. 4451, 4459 (1991).
193. CODE CIVIL Law No. 75-17 (Fr.) on the voluntary termination of pregnancy, as
amended by CODE CIVIL Law No. 79-1204 (Fr.) This act permits an abortion to be per-
formed by a doctor up to the end of the tenth week of pregnancy.
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thorized the use of a drug known as RU 486, a pill that induces
abortion, and in 1990 the government decided to subsidize the
cost of the pill."'
Liberia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand have followed
the Austrian and West German examples and expressly
decriminalized medical interventions for the period between fer-
tilization and implantation. This is significant because in these
countries the use of contraceptive methods in this period, such
as RU 486, fall wholly outside the abortion laws.1" 5
Since 1978 the right to abortion has been broad and liberal
in China. 196 Family planning is a matter of state policy.197
The 1979 Cuban Penal Code19 8 provided that abortion was
illegal only when performed without the woman's consent, or on
other than hospital premises, or if the procedure fails to comply
with established norms or is performed for profit. 99
In 1981 the Netherlands reformed its law, granting the right
to abortion in cases of physical or psychological distress. 200 As a
matter of practice, however, the Netherlands was "long famous
for having restrictive legislation on the books while remaining an
abortion haven ....
194. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1990, at A7, col. 1.
195. The use of antiprogestin drugs such as RU 486 makes the termination of a
pregnancy a safe and effective procedure and a viable mode of medical treatment during
the six weeks since the last menstrual period. Cook & Dickens, International Develop-
ments, supra note 96, at 1308.
196. See Note, Abortion in the USSR and China, supra note 187, at 1081. In March
1978 the Fifth National People's Congress adopted a new constitution. One article pro-
vided that the state advocates and encourages family planning. 2 Hongguo Xianfa Art.
53 (1980), translated in 1 Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China 1, 14
(1982).
197. Note, Abortion in USSR and China, supra note 187, at 1081. As a result, local
officials began to compel women to have abortions. Id. The criminal code did not limit
this result because it made no reference to abortion - either to the woman or to the
person performing the abortion. Id. at 1083. This author's view is that compelling abor-
tion is a form of denying the right to reproductive freedom. See supra note 181.
198. Until 1979 abortions and sterilizations were illegal under the concepts of the
1870 Spanish Penal Code. Alvarez-Lajonchere, Commentary on Abortion Law and Prac-
tice in Cuba, 1989 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 93-95 (Supp. 3). In approximately
1936 some flexibility in the practice of abortion was permitted. In 1959 the government
recognized the relationship of health to family planning and instructed the Ministry of
Public Health to promote the health of the population and to give priority to women and
children. Contraceptives then available were distributed. Id. at 93.
199. Id. at 94-95. From 1968 the number of abortions increased and peaked in 1974.
Thereafter the number of abortions as well as the number of births declined every year
between 1974 and 1980.
200. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 348 (citation omitted).
201. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 348.
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Since 1986 the world trend toward recognition of the right
to obtain an abortion has continued with significant changes in
the laws of Canada,202 Czechoslovakia,2 0 3 Greece, 20  Hungary,
Rumania, the Soviet Union and Viet Nam.205 Rumania is a par-
ticularly interesting jurisdiction. There, in 1966 and in 1985, the
government restricted the right to abortion on request, which
had existed from 1957, in order to increase the state's popula-
tion.206 As of January 1, 1990, the new Rumanian Government
lifted these restrictions to reinstate the right to abortion on
request.2 07
In states accounting for approximately twenty-five percent
of the world's population abortion can be elected on social/medi-
cal grounds 20 which consider the following social factors as risks
202. Cook & Dickens, International Developments, supra note 96, at 1306 (citations
omitted). In January 1988 the provisions of Canada's criminal code providing that hospi-
tal therapeutic abortion committees alone were permitted to certify clinical grounds for
abortions were declared unconstitutional under the Canadian Charter of Right and Free-
doms. The law which was rejected had caused delays that harmed women's physical and
psychological well-being.
203. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 79 (citations omitted). In 1986
Czechoslovakia eliminated requirements that abortion be approved by a committee and
that abortion be performed for medical or social reasons only. Abortions are now availa-
ble on request through 12 weeks of pregnancy and up to 24 weeks for fetal defects or if
the woman's life would be threatened by continuing the pregnancy. Id.
204. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 79. Greece revised its abortion
law and legalized first trimester procedures on request. Previously, however, although
abortions were technically illegal, as a matter of practice they had been readily available
from physicians. Id.
205. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 79 (citations omitted). Viet
Nam omitted all references to abortion from the criminal law although abortion on re-
quest was already legal. Id.
206. In 1985, Rumania again sought to prohibit the exercise of the right to abortion
by taxing unmarried persons over age 25 and married persons who remained childless for
more than two years without a medical reason. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note
96, at 79 (citations omitted). However, even during the periods when the restrictions
were in effect the practice did not change - illegal abortions were very common and
reached a higher rate than any other Western European country in which the right to
abortions had been unaffected. Id.
207. Id. (citations omitted).
208. The countries in this category include the African countries of Burundi, Sey-
chelles, Zambia; the Asian and Oceania countries of Australia, India, Japan, Korea (Dem.
Rep.), and Taiwan; the European countries of Cyprus, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, and
Poland; in North America Barbados and Belize; and Uruguay in South America. Hen-
shaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, Table 1; Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies,
supra note 2, at Table 1; P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at Table 1.1. Cook and Henshaw
would include Bulgaria, Finland, France, and Great Britain in this category. However,
because the practice in those states makes abortion available on request, this author
included these states in the "abortions on request" jurisdiction. See supra note 185,
Moreover, countries such as Germany (West), India, Japan and most countries of eastern
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to the mother's health should the pregnancy continue and thus
as proper bases to exercise the right: inadequate income, poor
housing, and unmarried status.0 e In jurisdictions accounting for
approximately twelve percent of the world's population, the
right to an abortion may be exercised on broad medical grounds,
for example, to avert threat to a woman's general health and for
genetic or juridical reasons such as rape or incest. 10
Finally countries that impose the most restrictive limita-
tions on the right to an abortion make up about one quarter of
Europe and Great Britain consider such social medical factors and interpret these
grounds broadly so that, particularly at early stages, abortions, in effect, are available on
request. Thus, these countries arguably should be considered in the "on request" cate-
gory. For example, in India, a very populous state, the failure of contraception alone is
justification for termination of pregnancies on grounds that it is likely adversely to affect
the mental health of the pregnant woman. In fact, since the late 1950s, in order to reduce
the rate of population growth, the Indian Government has been paying monetary incen-
tives to those who undergo sterilizations. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at
335. Significantly, while most Latin American Countries have rather restrictive laws (see
infra note 213 and accompanying text), Uruguay considers that an additional child
causes social or economic hardship and is reason enough to exercise the right. Id. at 342
n.182. Isaacs lists Czechoslovakia and Hong Kong in this category. Id. Interestingly, in
South Korea where abortions are illegal except for medical and "philanthropic" reasons,
they have been routinely performed as a matter of practice since 1962. P. SACHDEV,
supra note 165, at 9. By 1982 about one-half of South Korean wives have had an induced
abortion. Id.
209. Significantly, the World Health Organization's definition of health includes
mental health. Generally, health, when used in the context of abortion law, refers to both
physical and mental health. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 348. For exam-
ple, in the United States the Supreme Court defined health to include "all factors -
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and woman's age - relevant to the well be-
ing of the patient." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). In Canada, the interpreta-
tion of therapeutic abortions includes those to avert mental distress of the woman.
Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 348 (citations omitted).
210. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 76-77. Some of these statutes
recognize the right to an abortion only when a woman's physical health is threatened
while others have a broader interpretation permitting the procedure when either physical
or mental health is threatened. The following list of countries that comprise this cate-
gory designates the countries where mental health is a basis with an "M" next to the
country's name. The African countries in this category are Algeria, Cameroon, Congo,
Egypt, Ethiopia, French Polynesia, Ghana (M), Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia (M),
Morocco, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa (M), Tanzania, Uganda, and
Zimbabwe; Hong Kong, Israel, Jordan, Korea (Rep. of), Kuwait, Malaysia, Mongolia, Ne-
pal, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Vanuatu in Asia and
Oceania; the European Countries of Albania, Northern Ireland, Lichstenstein (M), Lux-
embourg (M), Portugal (M), Spain (M), and Switzerland; the North American Countries
of Bermuda (M), Costa Rica, Jamaica, Montserrat (M), and Trinidad and Tobago; and
the South American Countries of Argentina, Bolivia, Guyana, and Peru. Id. at Table 1;
Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies, supra note 2, at Table 1; P. SACHDEV, supra note 165,
at Table 1.1. See also Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 314.
354 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. [Vol. XVII:2
the world's population. 211 This group of states includes most
countries of Islamic faith (for example, Indonesia and Ban-
gladesh), about half of the countries in Africa (for example, Ni-
geria and the Republic of South Africa),212 approximately two-
211. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 76-77. This category is repre-
sented by the African countries of Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central Afr.
Republic Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, and Zaire; Afghani-
stan, Bangladesh, Burma, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Sri Lanka, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen in Asia and Oceania; Ireland
in Europe; the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, and Panama in North America; and Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Para-
guay and Venezuela in South America. Id. at Table 1; Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies,
supra note 2, at Table 1; P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at Table 1.1. See also Isaacs,
Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 314-18.
212. The scope of the right to exercise reproductive choice varies greatly in Africa.
The laws in sub-Saharan Africa are rather restrictive; the laws in Francophone Africa are
more restrictive than those in Anglophone Africa. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra
note 7, at 315. Currently, most of sub-Saharan Africa allows abortion only when the
mother's life is in danger, although a few countries have established more liberal laws.
Mashalaba, supra note 137. Francophone African countries, contrary to the trend in An-
glophone African countries, "almost uniformly forbid abortion, discourage contraceptive
use and are likely to consider sterilization a criminal offense." Isaacs, Reproductive
Rights, supra note 7, at 315. In Anglophone Africa, on the other hand, governments
support family planning and permit sterilization where necessary to protect the life or
health of the person. Id. at 315-16 nn.29-30. In Anglophone Africa (including Ghana,
Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, and Uganda) and the Caribbean countries of
Barbados, Bermuda, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad
and Tobago, doctors may consider a variety of factors including mental condition to de-
termine whether continuing a pregnancy poses a threat to health. Id. at 348 (citing Cook
& Dickens, Abortion Laws in Commonwealth Countries, 30 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEoIS.,
Table 1). North African countries, excepting Libya, all support national family planning
programs. Id. at 316 and 316 n.31. Libya, the only country that does not support family
planning, wishes to increase its population. Id. Tunisia and Egypt have been concerned
with rapid population growth and have instituted contraceptive distribution programs.
Id. (citations omitted.) On the other hand, oil-producing Arab states limit or do not
support access to modern forms of contraception. In general, the laws restrict abortions
to save the life or protect the health of the woman. Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates give no government support to family planning, although the
president of Iraq was reported to have liberalized his country's laws by canceling regula-
tions that prohibited female sterilization and required doctor's prescriptions for all con-
traceptives. Id. at 316 n.34. "Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Syria either prohibit abortion completely or permit it only to
save the life of the woman." Id. at 316 n.35. However, abortion for health reasons is
available in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. Id. (citations omitted). In 1982 Kuwait
modified its law to permit abortion if the pregnancy would result in gross physical harm
to the woman or if the fetus had brain damage beyond hope of treatment. Id. (citation
omitted). The Government of Turkey, which permits abortion to save the life of the
woman, in rape cases, or where a child is likely to be born deformed, has proposed mak-
ing abortion available on request during the first trimester of pregnancy. Id. (citation
omitted). Tunisia allows abortion on request during the first trimester of pregnancy. Id.
at 316-17.
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thirds of the countries in Latin America213 and three countries in
Western Europe (Belgium, Ireland and Malta).214 These restric-
tive laws, however, do not reflect the actual practice in these
states.2 15 Despite legal restraints on family planning services,
such services, including abortion, are available because laws are
interpreted flexibly or not enforced. 16
Abortion is regularly practiced in Muslim countries, for ex-
ample, which supposedly have restrictive regulations. Countries
such as Bangladesh and Indonesia plainly circumvent the
prohibitions against abortion by allowing women to exercise
their right in the guise of menstrual regulation - a procedure
identical to an induced abortion but without a pregnancy test.2"
In Latin America women who need an abortion and have
the economic means of procuring one, have no problems finding
competent physicians to perform the procedure s.2 1 Abortion ser-
vices are readily available with virtually all major cities having
physicians who perform abortions and clinics that specialize in
the procedure. 19 In Rio de Janeiro there is a chain of abortion
clinics that advertises in the newspapers without using the word
213. In Latin American countries such as Columbia, Chile, Brazil, Peru, and El Sal-
vador abortions up to the tenth week are permitted on juridical grounds such as rape or
incest, eugenic, or fetal indications of genetic defects or other impairment. Id. at 348
n.217. Abortion to protect the health of the woman is permitted in Argentina, Chile,
Costa Rica, Honduras, Peru and Uruguay. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at
347 nn.206-11. In Latin America, however, very few prosecutions are brought against
alleged abortionists and, as a matter of practice, abortions are available. See infra notes
216, 218-19.
214. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 1 (citing C. TIETZE, & S. HENSHAW, INDUCED
ABORTION: A WORLD REviEw (6th ed. 1986)); Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96,
at Table 1; Cook & Dickens, International Developments, supra note 96, at Table 1;
Cook, Abortion Laws and Policies, supra note 2, at Table 1; P. SACHDEV, supra note 165,
at Table 1.1. Interestingly, countries with restrictive abortion laws are primarily in the
developing world. Isaacs, Reproductive Rights, supra note 7, at 349.
215. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 77-78, 79-81; P. SACHDRV, supra
note 165, at 1-4, 6; Ladipo, supra note 169, at 23; Samil, supra note 169, at 29.
216. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 77; P. SACHDEV, supra note 165,
at 1-3, 6. Countries such as Indonesia, South Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and
Korea, which limit the right to abortion, simply do not enforce the laws. Id. at 1.
217. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 2; Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96,
at 77-78. For example, Bangladesh supports clinics that provide menstrual regulation for
up to 10 or 12 weeks gestation as a public health measure. Similarly, menstrual regula-
tion is performed regularly in Indonesia and Malaysia. Id. (citations omitted).
218. P. SACHDEV, supra note 165, at 6.
219. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 78. Conversely, in India and
Bangladesh the lack of facilities makes legal abortion and menstrual regulation basically
unavailable. Similarly, Ghana has relaxed restrictions and Togo has eliminated them but
the availability of services has not progressed.
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In sum, the "general practice of states common to civilized
nations," as reflected in domestic law or as evidenced by actual
practice (customary international law) reveals universal accept-
ance of the right to reproductive freedom including the most
controversial choice: abortion.
IV. CONCLUSION
A clear goal of human rights law, however "sourced," is to
establish and ensure respect and dignity for the individual. Such
respect and dignity includes the rights to privacy, health, and
equality, including equal participation in the social, political, ec-
onomic and cultural life of the state. These individual rights,
contained in international agreements, comprise obligations on
states either as signatories or because the instruments evidence
customary law.
Such general rights encompass an individual's right to re-
productive freedom. International tribunals have acknowledged
and states have admitted that the right to privacy includes the
right to plan a family. Successful family planning clearly rests
upon reproductive freedom. Moreover, it is uncontroverted that
no fetal right to life exists in international law. Thus, reproduc-
tive freedom, grounded in the right to privacy, cannot be im-
paired by "balancing" the right of reproductive freedom against
a non-existent fetal right to life.
In addition, women's human rights to health and to equality
under international law are all but illusory without reproductive
freedom. For women, the right to health is wedded to their abil-
ity to plan a family. Likewise, the right equally to participate in
matters of the state requires that women choose whether and
when to raise a family.
For women, autonomy is clearly linked to the choice to
reproduce. The lack of freedom to decide responsibly on the
number or spacing of children (if any), has deprived women of
benefits regarding their health, education, employment, and
their roles in family and public life. Denial of the right to repro-
ductive choice will deprive women of their right to participation
220. Henshaw, Induced Abortion, supra note 96, at 81. Those without economic
means, however, seek abortions by unskilled abortionists who pose substantial health
risks to women in violation of the fundamental right to health. See supra notes 116-46
and accompanying text (Part II(B)).
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in the social, cultural, political, educational, and economic life of
the state in contravention of their international human rights.
Moreover, the right to reproductive choice is found in virtu-
ally all the domestic laws around the world. Such widespread
domestic legislation establishes reproductive freedom as a "gen-
eral principle of law recognized by civilized nations." These laws
also evidence the practice of states thereby establishing repro-
ductive freedom as a rule of customary international law. In ad-
dition, a review of actual state practice shows that abortions are
universally performed and that states routinely accept and even
condone such activity by failing to take steps either to prevent
the acts or to punish the actors. This practice of states is sepa-
rate and further evidence that the right to reproductive freedom
has become an international customary right.
The historical reasons and purposes behind state regulation
of choice are telling. States do not deny that reproductive free-
dom is an issue of privacy. Nor do states disagree that denial of
choice can result, and through the years has resulted, in serious
health concerns for mothers and infants alike. Rather, the enact-
ment of laws limiting family planning has been based solely
upon the state's needs - the desire to defer to influential reli-
gious groups or to curb or enhance population.
Such a "sovereign" agenda without regard for and in dero-
gation of the individual's human rights was precisely the type of
government activity condemned at Nuremberg. The use of an
individual as a pawn of the state without regard or respect for
the individual's rights pertaining to family life is contrary to
human rights principles. Dictating reproduction to further gov-
ernmental, often linked with religious, goals impermissibly er-
odes the very harmony, respect and dignity to which human be-
ings are entitled and that modern day international human
rights laws were designed to protect.
Denying individuals, and in particular women, the legal
right to reproductive freedom violates international law. A wo-
man denied control of her reproductive capacity "is truly being
treated as a means to an end which she does not desire but over
which she has no control. She is the passive recipient of a deci-
sion made by others as to whether her body is to be used to
nurture a new life. Can there be anything that comports less
with human dignity and self-respect? How can a woman in this
1991]
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position have any sense of security with respect to her
person? 221
221. Morgenthaler, Smoling and Scott v. The Queen, 44 D.L.R.4th 385, 492 (Can.
1988).
